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Abstract 
 
Democratic Confederalism: A Radical Model for Political Emancipation 
in Northern Syria.  
 
 
Patrick William Harned, MGPS, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Zoltan Barany 
 
This thesis is a study of the democratic confederalist movement in Northern Syria, 
known as the Rojavan Revolution. Through an analysis of the political thought of Abdullah 
Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, and the influence of his political writings on political 
developments in Turkey and Syria beginning in 1999, I connect the development of 
democratic confederalist institutions and transformations in Kurdish political activity to 
the epistemic break in Öcalan’s political writings, following the transformation of his 
political ideology from a traditional Marxist-Leninist to the confederalist approach, which 
is strongly influenced by the writings of the social ecology Murray Bookchin, as well as 
the popularization of the works of postmodern social theory among the Turkish left.  
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 6 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
In the midst of the Syrian Civil War, reports from Rojava, the northern region of 
the embattled Middle Eastern country tell of a radically transformed civil society, 
practicing direct democracy, gender egalitarianism, and an elimination of the sectarian 
politics which have plagued the region for decades under authoritarian rulers. The events 
followed the establishment of the three independent cantons of the Democratic 
Federation of North Syria in 2014, although de facto military control and political control 
over the region was established following the withdrawal of Syrian regime forces in 2011 
The subsequent emergence of  network of political organizations and self-governing 
institutions during what is called the Rojava Revolution constitutes one of the most 
progressive and indeed successful revolutionary political movements in the history of the 
modern Middle East, implementing a form of social libertarianism bordering on anarcho-
communism, and inspired by the late political writings of Abdullah Öcalan, founder of 
the PKK, the militant leftist Turkish group that fought the Turkish state following the 
1980 military coup in Turkey.   
The term Rojava Revolution refers to then the subsequent transformation of 
political and civil society that occurred in the wake of the transfer of power from the 
government to political parties that prior to the revolution in 2011 had remained 
underground, and the subsequent institutionalization of democratic confederalism, a 
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decentralized system of governance first proposed by the social ecologist Murray 
Bookchin. Bookchin’s political treatises, largely marginalized in the Western academy, 
were enormously influential in shaping the political thought of Abdullah Öcalan, whose 
political pamphlets, critiques and treatises would provide the foundation for the 
governing philosophy of the umbrella coalition that emerged to govern Rojava, The 
Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM). The advent of democratic-
confederalist thinking among left-wing Kurdish parties such as the PKK has both 
produced a significant epistemological break in the understanding of democracy and 
revolution among large portions of society in south-eastern Turkey and northern Syria, 
shifting political praxis away from the Marxist-Leninist model of armed revolution and 
towards the production of decentralized institutions designed to undermined and resist the 
exercise of state authority. This is an exceptionally salient shift in the practice of what is 
sometimes termed “ethno-politics” or “ethno-nationalism” and has produced a wide rift 
between traditional Kurdish political parties based on the nationalist model and the new 
“confederalist” movement which explicitly rejections concepts of ethno nationalism as 
providing a sound ontological basis for political emancipation. 
In interrogating the meaning of revolution and democratization as it is understood 
by the adherents of this political movement, a certain amount of attention must be given 
to distinguishing the underlying philosophical basis. The events in Syria provide an 
opportunity to revisit questions regarding the strength of authoritarian governments in the 
region and the possibility for the emergence of autonomous democratic governance. The 
seeming “otherness” of the Rojavan Revolution in both political discourse and practice 
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have left it largely marginalized within the larger discussion of what is termed political 
democratization. The model of “democratization” and indeed political revolution 
followed by the political parties organizing the Rojavan revolution has nearly nothing to 
do with concepts of democratization or revolution that would be familiar to practitioners 
of Western political science. Joseph Schumpeter, in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, writes that  “The 'democratic method, is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.”1 Writing some forty years later, Samuel 
Huntington correctly observed that, regarding whether or not this definition of democracy 
as primarily an institutional arrangement would hold, “by the 1970’s the debate was 
over” and that “Sweeping discussions of democracy in terms of normative theory sharply 
declined, at least in American scholarly discussions, and replaced by efforts to understand 
the nature of democratic institutions, how they function, and the reasons why they 
develop and collapse.”2 Moreover, this view of democracy as fundamentally a normative 
institution coincides with a significant decline in the actual perceived democratic value of 
the institution itself. That is to say, democratic institutions are not necessarily in and of 
themselves capable of delivering democratic legitimacy, even in liberal democratic states. 
This was articulated by Tala Assad in Formations of the Secular, when he suggested that 
“The distinctive feature of modern liberal governance is neither compulsion (force) nor 
                                                 
1 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper Collins, 1950). page 250 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1993). page 3 
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negotiation (consent) but the statecraft that uses self-discipline and participation, “law”, 
and “economy” as elements of political strategy.”3 The primary feature of Asad’s 
conception of liberal governance is the use of a political medium as an element of this 
liberal statecraft which redefines individual practices of the self to create a “transcendent” 
representation of the citizen rooted in the conception of a “national identity.” In Assad’s 
conception then, the minority dilemma is an inevitable consequence of liberal 
government's attempt to “transform the self” by rearticulating the parameters of 
citizenship. One such example in the relevant case is the long held insistence by many 
elements of the Turkish government that Kurds are just “mountain Turks.”4 The attempt 
to construct a “national identity” through the mediation of individual identity is a feature 
of liberal governance that is shared across secular Middle Eastern and European 
countries, even though other functional features of democratic institutions may not be 
present. 
Despite Huntington’s proclamations, discussions about what democracy could 
and should mean had not ceased in large parts of the developing world, where the 
institutional arrangements advocated by liberals would be varyingly used to enforce and 
impose systems of juridical power based on reactionary nationalism and authoritarianism. 
The attempt to offer a different philosophical and theoretical approach to the meaning of 
democratic change, particularly in the Middle East, all of whose largely authoritarian 
                                                 
3 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press, 2003). page 5 
4 M. Michael Gunter, The Kurds A Modern History, 1st edition (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 
2015).  
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nations hold regular “democratic” elections, then becomes a germane subject of 
discussion. In the case of Rojava, the political revolution which took place was not based 
in any recognizable understanding of democracy as an institutional arrangement 
resembling that described by Schumpeter and Huntington and largely accepted by the 
Western academies. It was based rather on a growing body of political critique produced 
by the imprisoned founder of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, who following his arrest and 
trial began writing political treatises in prison on Imrali island that had a major discursive 
and political impact on the Turkish left and the events which lead to the Rojavan 
revolution. Moreover, these treatises challenged the underlying philosophy of what can 
be termed the chief political project of colonialism, which was the organization of the 
entire world system into a system of sovereign nation states resembling those which had 
emerged in Europe throughout the early modern period. Contrary to the suggestion of 
Huntington, the discussion regarding “democratic theory” was not closed. The Rojavan 
revolution in fact rejected many of the institutional arrangements implied in Huntington's 
definition of “democracy”. The movement incorporated elements of political anarchism 
resembling the movements that emerged in Revolutionary Catalonia and the Paris 
Commune, and incorporating elements of critical theory produced by American and 
European modern and postmodern scholars such as Murray Bookchin, Fernand Braudel, 
Pierre Clastres, the Frankfurt School and other influential critics of capitalism and 
European modernity. This produced an alarmingly distinct epistemological break 
between the earlier left-wing intellectual and paramilitary movements, based largely on 
unswerving adherence to doctrines of Marxist-Leninism, and their newer counterparts, 
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who rather than seeking to overthrow the state, began to undermine it through the 
practice of democratic confederalism. 
My thesis constitutes an attempt to trace the intellectual roots of the Rojava 
Revolution to their proper historical and intellectual roots by examining the textual basis 
of the movement in Abdullah Öcalan’s Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, and to 
discuss how the radical anti-authoritarian political institutions developed in the three 
cantons of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria emerged as a response to the 
ideology of authoritarian nationalism that governed Syria as well as other Arab nations in 
the post-colonial era. Looking closely at the philosophical underpinnings of “democracy” 
as it is understood by practitioners in Rojava leads two important conclusions. The first is 
that democracy as political system cannot be uniformly across the globe without 
consideration for the differing economic, social, cultural and historical conditions that 
shape the limits of these institutional arrangements. In other words, like any other 
instance of deterritorialization, wherein a concept, practice or political ideology emerging 
from western Europe impacted development in the Orient, the transfer of “democracy” 
both as a discourse and as an institutional arrangement, produced ripples of 
inconsistencies, reactions, and counter flows that generated a correspondingly strong 
attempt to reshape the meaning of democracy in the East. Any attempt to glimpse then 
the reality of democratic practice that emerges in East from a Western lens will produce 
distortions and refractions that obfuscate a clear picture of how other societies can and 
choose to understand and use certain concepts. The other, closely corresponding 
conclusion, is that any attempt to approach a theorization of politics in the East without a 
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healthy respect for the actual production of political discourse in political treatises, 
ideology and political discourse will inevitably lead to this obfuscated gaze. Thus 
throughout the thesis I discuss various ways in which certain scholars paradigms, such as 
“ethno-politics” fail to take seriously the intellectual achievements of reform movements 
or the failures of Western-style political institutions in shaping truly democratic political 
arrangements in the East.  
 
The advent of an anarchist political movement in Northern Syria in response to 
decades of totalitarian government and repression, implementing and practicing 
democratic confederalism as articulated in Abdullah Öcalan’s Manifesto for a 
Democratic Civilization is thus not merely a new iteration of ethno-nationalist or 
sectarian politics, nor can it be understood within traditional paradigms of 
democratization, but should be understood as a explicit and indigenously embraced 
reaction to the failures of the imposition of western-style nation states. Moreover, unlike 
political scientists who take for granted the prevailing institutional arrangements in 
Middle Eastern countries, or who approach the practice of ethno-politics from a 
constructivist lens which attempts to describe political praxis as non-ideological or 
“identity based”, I suggest that to attempt to analyze a political movement while ignoring 
its ideological foundations is a way of robbing Easterners of the ability to produce critical 
political thought. Paradoxically, the suggestion that one can study the development of a 
political movement such as Western liberalism while ignoring the writings of Locke, 
Rousseau, Hobbes, or Adam Smith, and other important intellectuals who played a key 
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role in the development of liberal thought would almost certainly meet skepticism. For 
this reason, I consider the serious analysis of political treatises which articulate the 
philosophical basis of the Rojavan Revolution to be an important first step in 
understanding the politics of its adherents. 
  The difference between this new articulation of democracy and the traditional 
understanding of democratic institution building articulated by the likes of Schumpeter 
and Huntington, as well as the problematic dynamics that state institutions have 
introduced have been the subject of some discussion already. The underlying political 
philosophy produced by political parties that consider themselves part of a larger 
democratic revolution occurring in the Middle East underscores the dominant political 
philosophy of Arab Nationalism, which until 1967 was a secure modus operandi for 
exercising political power, has resulted in a structural deficiency within the Arab state. 
The practice of state power under a hegemonic “Arab” identity resulted not in national 
liberation, but social fragmentation and a vector of interminable violence and sectarian 
infighting. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt lamented the dilemma of 
stateless persons in the 20th century attributing as the cause of their persecution “because 
they were born into the wrong kind of race or the wrong kind of class or drafted by the 
wrong kind of government.” Scholars such as both Larbi Sadiki have pointed out that the 
rise of “electoral authoritarianism” has hamstrung democratic development in the region.5 
                                                 
5 Larbi Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford University Press, 
2009), http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562985.001.0001/acprof-
9780199562985. page 10 
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Nicola Pratt points out that political parties in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, have not 
represented “a conduit for contentious politics”, and that political liberalization in these 
countries sought to control and manage extent of political opposition. Janine Clark 
concurs with this view in a 2017 study of Jordanian and Moroccan politics, where she 
reveals how authoritarian rulers in Morocco and Jordan coopt political rivals and 
circumscribe the limits of acceptable political opposition, thus preventing the emergence 
of a contentious and democratic political system.6  
Despite the considerable success of the region’s authoritarian regimes in 
assimilating and coopting political rivals, the ideological foundations of state power, in 
this case Arab nationalism, did not provide for the cooptation of political groups which 
were seen fundamentally as not belonging to the body politic, such as Assyrians and 
Kurds. This unassimilability became reflected in the literature on Middle Eastern ethno-
politics, which primarily saw the democratic and anti-authoritarian movements of the 
regions minorities as projects of “ethnic nationalism” and obfuscated their democratizing 
tendencies, as well as their dialectic relationship to the ideology of Arab Ba’athism. 
There emerged a tendency to view the national liberation movements of the region as 
primarily sectarian and nationalist, eschewing study of both conflict within nationalist 
movements regarding crucial political issues such as sectarianism, gender equity, and 
economic policy, as well as ideologically leftist movements such as the one that emerged 
in Rojava. David Romano (2006) for instance, in examining the development of Kurdish 
                                                 
6 Janine A. Clark, Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco: Strategies of Centralization and Decentralization 
(Columbia University Press, 2018). 
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nationalism, identified political context, mobilization methods and identity as the primary 
factors contributing to the early success of the PKK in fighting the Turkish state.7 This 
constructivist approach to understanding the politics of the PKK suggest that the actual 
dynamic shifts in political ideology are less important than geopolitics, identity, and 
praxis. In fact, what this thesis demonstrates is that all of these elements are contingent 
on underlying ideology. The epistemic break between the old, Leninist PKK and the new, 
confederalist PKK has resulted in a major shift in all three of these elements. This further 
undermines the concept of “identity” as a motivating political factor, suggesting that 
identity is an ideological concept which is not inextricably linked to one’s ethnic or 
linguistic background, but is rather interlaid with certain ideological assumptions, such as 
nationalism. When the ideology of nationalism is rejected, so too are the organizing 
principles of ethnic identity. 
 Additionally, scholars have identified a “silent statism” within the 
literature that tends to view democratic transformation as the capture and reformation of 
existing states through largely non violent protest movements, rather than the 
transformation of local politics through the establishment of grassroots institutions with 
the capacity to resist and transform the state from below.8 As mentioned above in the 
works by Nicola Pratt and Janine Clark, the overemphasis on electoral politics as a force 
                                                 
7 David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, 1 edition 
(Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
8 Damian Gerber and Shannon Brincat, “When Öcalan Met Bookchin: The Kurdish Freedom Movement 
and the Political Theory of Democratic Confederalism,” Geopolitics 0, no. 0 (October 16, 2018): 1–25, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1508016. 
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for democratization ignores that electoral politics is often the locus of authoritarian 
cooptation and control.9 Revolutionary movements do not seek assimilation within 
existing power structures, but rather radical reshaping of such structures – meaning they 
must propose an ideological alternative to status quo power relations.  
 Öcalan’s work and the movement based on his writings sought not to recreate the 
mirror image of Arab nationalism, but to subvert it entirely by offering an different 
articulation and practice of political relations. The Rojava Revolution is unique not 
merely because it instituted self-governance, but because it appeared to acutely identify 
and respond to the core ideological problems of both Arab nationalism, and the sectarian 
responses to Arab nationalism found in separatist movements across the region. The 
proposition of the Rojava Revolution is that the path to democracy lies not in further 
dividing the region along sectarian lines by responding to the authoritarian practice of 
Arab nationalism with Kurdish or Assyrian nationalism, but in dismantling the 
ideological foundations of nationalism in order to open new vistas for autonomous and 
democratic governance in the region not based on sectarian identity.  
 Scholars of contemporary nationalism, while recognizing the ideological 
foundations of nationalist movements, often ignore its discursive roots. For example, 
David Brown, in Contemporary Nationalism writes that “Contemporary nationalist 
                                                 
9 Nicola Christine Pratt, Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World (Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Boulder, CO, 2007). and Clark, Janine A. Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco: Strategies of 
Centralization and Decentralization. Columbia University Press, 2018. 
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politics involves ideological confrontation between competing constructions of the 
nation. Groups and individuals within the same state differ as to whether they aim at a 
civic nation of equal individual citizens, an ethno-cultural nation of ethnic sameness, or a 
multicultural nation of equal status ethnic or ethno-regional segments.”10 This view 
effectively establishes nationalism as a discursive structure beyond which no 
conversation regarding politics can take place, while ignoring the fact that it is the 
structure nation-state politics itself which establishes nationalism as the chief discourse of 
legitimate politics. Meaning that political movements that challenge the discursive 
structure of nationalism itself do not fall into any of the categories that Brown describes. 
Especially in the case of Iraq, Syria and Turkey, where the majority of the worlds 
ethnic Kurds are located, contemporary nationalism was introduced through the 
organized production and spread of political ideology by Arab nationalist, whose 
ideologies had a particular historical genealogy. The influential work of Michel Aflaq, 
11who wrote the founding texts of Baathist ideology and enjoyed cult-like status in Iraq 
and Syria, is largely ignored, while the ideology of Ba’athism, a highly developed and 
systematic vision of Arab-nationalist politics, not dissimilar to Kemalist ideology as 
articulated by Gökalp12, is viewed as secondary to understanding developments in Middle 
Eastern political movements. Elie Kedourie wrote, in the very first sentence of 
Nationalism, that “Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 
                                                 
10 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics, 1 edition 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2000). 
11 اﻟﺒﻌﺚ  ﺳﺒﯿﻞ  ﻓﻲ , ﻣﯿﺸﯿﻞ ، ﻋﻔﻠﻖ  ( واﻟﻨﺸﺮ  ﻟﻠﻄﺒﺎﻋﺔ  اﻟﻄﻠﯿﻌﺔ  دار ،, 1972). 
12 Ziya Gökalp, The Principles of Turkism (Brill Archive, 1968). 
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19th century.”13 In contrast the much celebrated Imagined Communities,14 while 
admitting naturally the European origins of nationalism, makes no reference to the 
nationalists themselves - the political theorists, activists, writers and intellectuals who 
through their writing and political activism created the discourse of nationalism. Thus 
one can have nationalism without nationalists. 
 My suggestion here is that the failure to recognize nationalism as a discursive 
structure that reinforces certain limits on political discourse has both naturalized and 
reified that discourse in the national politics of many countries. By naturalize I mean that 
the underlying assumptions of nationalism are so deeply rooted in the national 
consciousness as well as that of political observers that it does not occur to political 
actors to look outside the confines of nationalist discourse for solutions to political 
problems. This means that any attempt to position oneself politically against the 
discourse of nationalism itself becomes increasingly difficult, because nationalism 
constitutes the central paradigm through which political discourse is framed. The failures 
of ethno-nationalist movements like the Kurdish independence movements in Iraq, Syria 
and Iran speak to the centrality of nationalist thinking among Middle Eastern political 
movements, even when those movements have attempted to oppose Arab nationalism, 
                                                 
13 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4 edition (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993). 
page 9 
14 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(Verso, 2006). 
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they have done so by constructing a counterpoised nationalist discourse.15 Early Kurdish 
movements chose to rather to attempt to develop their own concepts of “national 
liberation” in opposition to the central state, leading to decades of bloody conflict in 
Syria, Iraq and Turkey.16 One of the major conclusions reached through the analysis of 
the events and ideology of the Rojava Revolution is that such a positionality is possible - 
it is possible to position oneself ideologically outside of the confines of the central 
paradigm of nationalism, and it is still possible to oppose nationalism as a political 
project, rather than merely work within its paradigmatic limits. This is the major 
contribution of Öcalan’s work, and suggests a significant evolution in the contours of the 
conflict among “ethno-religious” groups in the modern nation state system.  
 Indeed, Öcalan views the state as the primary obstacle to the development of 
democratic political institutions, rather than the vehicle by which it is achieved. He 
explicitly rejected nationalism and the state as constructs deleterious to human social 
organization, claiming that “The protective influence of the nation state towards the 
chauvinistic owners of the nation states screens their populations from the enrichment of 
modern democracy.”17 Moreover, he locates the vehicle for transformation in “A change 
in consciousness in the Middle East, which needs to be initiated by a historical process 
                                                 
15 Gunter, The Kurds A Modern History. “This sense of national community occurred at more or less the 
same time that Turks and Arabs also began to embrace an ethnic sense of identity in place of the two previous basic 
forms of solidarity - the idea of Ottoman citizenship and membership of a religious community, or millet.”  page 2 
16 Gunter. page 2 
17 Abdullah Ocalan, Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilisation, trans. Klaus Happel (London ; Ann Arbor, 
Mich: Pluto Press, 2007). page 15 
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similar to the Renaissance, the Reformation or the Enlightenment in Europe.” 18  This 
attitude should not be confused however, with the largely modernist suggestion that the 
Middle East needs to “catch up” with Europe by adopting similar institutional 
arrangements. Rather the process that Öcalan envisions is largely a paradigmatic shift 
away from the chief European import into the Middle East: nationalist ideology. Thus he 
writes of the democratic project that must be undertaken  “Europe forms the right wing of 
democratic civilization and is at the same time hold it back.”19 
 
THE ROJAVA REVOLUTION 
The Rojava revolution officially took place in June of 2012 when, following the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Kurdish cities in northern Syria, the TEV-DEM  which 
seized control first of Kobane. This was followed shortly by the signing of the Erbil 
Agreement which gave the Democratic Union Party (PYD) de facto control over security 
and provision of services in Kobane. Though initially seen as a victory for the FSA which 
was fighting to overturn the Bashar al-Assad regime, the PYD  subsequently denied entry 
into Rojava to the Free Syrian Army, much to the chagrin of Barzani aligned political 
parties that wanted to unite Syrian Kurdish political parties in the fight to overturn the 
Assad government. This violated the principles of government that the PYD and 
affiliated parties sought to implement in accordance with the ideology of democratic 
                                                 
18 Ocalan. page 16 
19 Ocalan. page 17 
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confederalism, which focuses on “self defense” rather than traditional Leninist armed 
struggle against the state. Civil government in Rojava was founded on an exclusively 
anti-sectarian basis, and PYD intellectuals and officials have described the advent of the 
Democratic Federation of North Syria as an end not only of Ba’athism, but indeed of the 
nation state itself, a concept central to the writings of Öcalan. 
 Although there exists a burgeoning body of literature examining both Öcalan’s 
thought and the Rojava’s connection to European anarchism, much of this literature has 
yet to position the transformation of the PKK from a Marxist-Leninist militant group into 
its current anarchist iteration. Thomas Schmidinger’s Krieg und Revolution in Syrisch-
Kurdistan (2015) provides the most detailed account of the movement and connects its 
ideological origins to region wide trends, including the failure of Iraqi Kurdistan to fulfill 
the aspirations of Iraqi Kurds, devolving into factionalism and clientelism, neo-liberal 
economic reforms and servitude to Turkish interests. Most importantly, Schmidinger 
acknowledges that sectarianism, particularly in Ba’athist Syria and Iraq as well as 
Kemalist Turkey, were not based on primordial sectarian divisions of identity, but were 
rather constituted the results of a political ideology that imposed nationalism on the major 
Arab states as a necessary precondition for achieving development.20 Michel Aflaq 
combined elements of European fascism, Marxism and Arab nationalism in order to 
produce a political ideology which called for the dissolution of ethnic difference into a 
single national identity.21 Given the levels of ethnic and religious diversity in Syria and 
                                                 
20 Thomas Schmidinger, Rojava: Revolution, War and the Future of Syria’s Kurds (Pluto Press, 2018).  
21 اﻟﺒﻌﺚ  ﺳﺒﯿﻞ  ﻓﻲ , ﻣﯿﺸﯿﻞ . 
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Iraq, such an ideology was doomed to result in totalitarianism through a one-party 
system. Thomas Schmidinger correctly positions Öcalan’s thought and the Rojava 
revolution as a doctrine of political emancipation corollary to Ba’athist authoritarianism 
which had dominated the region since the 1960’s. Nevertheless, Schmidinger does not 
provide a particular focus on the intellectual origins of Öcalan’s ideas.  
 The key historical development which lead to the Rojava revolution was the arrest 
of Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya in February of 1999, four months after an agreement 
between Syria and Turkey saw him expelled from the former, and his subsequent 
imprisonment on Imrali Island. Influenced by the political thought of late American 
ecologist Murray Bookchin, as well as numerous other thinkers from Kropotkin, Foucault 
and Pierre Clastres, Öcalan developed in prison a systematic critique of the nation state 
resulting in the articulation of Democratic confederalism, which blended social ecology, 
feminism, libertarianism and anarcho-communism and adopted them to the history of the 
Middle East region and particularly the struggle of Kurds for self-determination and 
autonomy. Scholars such as Jongerden and Knapp (2016) have traced the origin of many 
of Öcalan’s ideas as well as described their systematic institutionalization within the 
Rojava political system.22 Other scholars contributed to better understanding the 
importance and nature of the ideological transformation which the PKK underwent, and 
how it adopted its earlier confrontational organizing strategies to democratic 
                                                 
22 Joost Jongerden and Michael Knapp, “Communal Democracy: The Social Contract and Confederalism 
in Rojava,” Comparative Islamic Studies 10, no. 1 (May 31, 2016): 87–109, 
https://doi.org/10.1558/cis.29642. 
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confederalism, while identifying the Rojava revolution as part of a second wave of 
agrarian revolutionary movements based not along the Leninist model of seizing state 
power. Can Cemgil in two separate articles has drawn attention to how the emergence of 
the Rojava political project problematizes the notion of a republican state as the ultimate 
protector of individual rights, as indeed the opposite has been presumed by mainstream 
research in much of the developing world.23  
 Further work on studying the emergence of the Rojava cantons can offer 
definitive answer to the determinacy of essentialist notions of ethnic and sectarian 
identities often employed in the study of Middle Eastern political movements. In many 
cases, these analyses both reproduce Orientalist conceptualizations of Middle Eastern 
people as incapable of sophisticated political thought or organization, and simultaneously 
reproduces the authoritarian vision of Middle Eastern society, first conceptualized by the 
early Ba’athist nationalists like Aflaq who saw these distinct cultures as anomalies to be 
absorbed into the Arab state in service of its developmental goals. Recent events, 
including the Rojava Revolution, have suggested a new way in which to systematically 
consider Middle Eastern politics, one that pits transnational democratic movements 
against ossified, nationalist regimes based on feudalistic relations between the state and 
its unassimilable citizens. In this context, democratic confederalism promises to be a 
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powerful tool to understanding the possibilities for democratic reform in the region, not 
through the institutionalization of Western European state-capitalism and representative 
democracy, but grass roots, ecologically base democratic councils which invite the most 
minute levels of participation from civil society.  
 The Rojava Revolution and its associated political discourses problematize the 
notion of “democratic consensus” proposed by Schumpeter and Huntington, by 
challenging the underlying discourses which legitimate certain fundamental elements of 
the nation state system. No serious study of of such political movements can be made 
without an understanding of the paradigmatic difference in political discourse and 
practice, and the new production of democratic theory emerging from the region. In other 
words, contra Huntington, there is still a political opportunity to articulate a discourse of 
democratic theory that positioned outside of the Western European paradigm. The 
significance then of the Rojava movement is that in articulating and practicing a new 
form of democracy, it is able to rescue the notion of democratization from both the 
totalizing discourses of Arab nationalism as well as the insistence of the Western 
academy that conversation on the topic is closed. 
THESIS OUTLINE 
Democratizing intellectual movements develop and propagate competing ethical 
and moral systems which create the organizational possibilities for the development of 
democratic institutions, and the grassroots institutionalization of such an ideology. Within 
any given political system, a certain amount of dissent is permitted, allow for the 
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cooptation of political rivals while preserving the ideological framework of 
authoritarianism. As continually emphasized in the works of Antonio Gramsci and Rudi 
Dutschke, revolutionary movements are successful not only through physical violence or 
force, but in reshaping and challenging the discursive hegemony of the state and the 
boundaries of legitimate dissent. The Rojava Revolution along with other protest 
movements must be analyzed and appreciated for its capacity to offer a complete 
alternative to hegemonic state discourses of Arab nationalism and electoral 
authoritarianism. This requires a serious inventory of the movement’s ideological, social 
and institutional components.  
 The remainder of this work will be separated in three chapters. The first two 
chapters will position Öcalan’s work in the context of its influences in European 
anarchism and postmodern social theory, analyzing the textual roots of Öcalan’s political 
system in the works of Immanuel Wallerstein, Pierre Clastres, Michel Foucault, Murray 
Bookchin and major works on communalism. Chapter 3 will give a historical overview of 
the development of democratic federalism in Northern Syria with emphasis on the 
development of institutions which reflect Öcalan’s political ideology. The conclusion will 
position the Rojava Revolution in the larger context of the Arab Spring and Middle East 
nationalist movements, with a goal of emphasizing democratic federalism’s grassroots 
origins as a response to totalitarian forms of government in the Middle East.  
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Chapter 2: The Political Thought of Abdullah Öcalan - The Roots of 
Civilization 
 
“Each stage of Civilization is arranged on the basis of a new fundamental 
paradigm. All this rearranging is a means of disguising, of obscuring and of 
enchaining those who are ruled.”24 
Abdullah Öcalan, Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 1 
 
The experience of democracy as an institutional structure often embedded within 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, and moreover the use of “democratizing” rhetoric 
to justify enormously costly wars on Middle Eastern countries have generated a significant 
amount of mistrust regarding the very meaning of democracy itself. This initially 
manifested itself as supposed incompatibility between Islam and democracy, making 
democracy unattainable for Muslim majority countries.25 This analysis was weak not only 
for the fact that the majority of the post-colonial authoritarian Arab governments are 
secular, and face significant challenges from religiously positioned protesters, as 
demonstrated by the emergence of the Morsi government in Egypt, but that it also ignores 
the possibility of an alternate, indigenous articulation of democracy which emerged from 
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intellectual developments occurring within Middle East itself. Such an articulation would 
necessarily contrast with the Western view of democracy as an institutional structure, or 
the incompatibility between Middle Eastern religious or cultural traditions and democracy 
by repositioning democratic discourse outside of the paradigmatic constraints imposed 
upon it by European intellectual hegemony. 
In fact, I argue that the image of democracy presented by Ocalan in Manifestor for 
a Democratic Civilization is such an indigenous articulation of democracy, one which 
contrasts starkly with the Western democratic discourse I described earlier. This 
articulation of what Ocalan refers to as a “democratic civilization”, distinct from 
institutional democracy, has arisen largely on the Turkish left, but more particularly among 
the Kurdish population of Turkey initially and later in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, this 
indigenous concept of democracy emerged through the adoption and synthesis of 
influential European postmodern texts whose Turkish translations became influential 
among the Turkish left. The influence and popularization of these works is evidenced 
Abdullah Öcalan’s political thought following his imprisonment on Imrali island. 
I additionally demonstrate that a significant shift in his political thinking occurred, 
and that his subsequent political writings constitute a dramatic departure from the original 
precepts upon which the political project of the PKK had been based. The traditional left 
in the Middle East has typically been occupied by Marxist-Leninist movements. However 
as a result of the influence of postmodern critiques of European capitalism and democracy, 
as well as a global decline in the perception of these institutions stability as a result of the 
Euro crisis and increasing levels of economic inequality, a epistemic shift is occurring in 
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the Middle Eastern Left on both the philosophic and political level. This epistemic shift 
has had a significant impact on the relationship between pro-democracy movements in the 
Middle East and authoritarian regimes. This ideological transformation is what gave way 
to the development of democratic confederalism in northern Syria (DFNS).  
The importance of developing indigenous concepts of political emancipation in a 
post-colonial context cannot be overstated. The traditional discourse of modernity which 
attempted to encourage colonized countries to adopt the institutional structures and 
practices of Western Europeans relied on the accusation that indigenous articulations of 
knowledge were incompatible with modern notions of progress and that thus the only route 
towards development lay in adopting European political institutions. Within the academic 
literature, the assumption that reform movements were constrained by the discursive 
limitations of modernity remains current. The argument here is that it became a chief 
concern of indigenous authors to demonstrate that their critiques were neither reactionary 
or subservient to Western intellectual discourses of modernity. The historiography of 
Islamic reform movements, for example, still rests largely on the notion that the intellectual 
innovations of early reform scholars like Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) or Sayyid Jamāl al-
Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897) cannot be considered “indigenous” intellectual achievements 
because they interacted with Western writings and discourses to produces their work. For 
example in The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century, Henri 
Lauziere writes,  
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“In light of these considerations, there is no easy answer to the question of 
whether modernist Salafism is an indigenous Islamic concept. Strictly speaking, it 
originated in the Orientalist circles of France, but Western- ers and non-
Westerners, Muslim and non-Muslim, all participated in its construction and 
commodification.”26 
 
Lauziere provides no definition of “indigenous Islamic concept”, nor any justification for 
why a concept or body of political thought must be dismissed from consideration as 
“indigenous” by virtue of its relationship with other intellectual traditions, a notion which 
is based on both a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between Western and 
Eastern thought, which dismisses as merely derivative any notion or concept which was 
produced even under the slightest influence of a Western writer, while failing to to apply 
the same standards in reverse.  
Despite the fundamental fallacy in attempting to evaluate the worth of an 
intellectual tradition based on its independence from other traditions, the critique 
provided an intellectual motor whereby indigenous authors were able to discover ways of 
positioning themselves outside of the discursive framework of Western modernity in 
order to parry the accusation that their critique of European institutions was merely 
“reactionary.” The notion of indigeneity thus is a critical part of Öcalan’s thought and 
synthesis. He was acutely aware that the hierarchical relationship which pervades and 
                                                 
26 Lauzière, Henri. The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: 
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indeed constructs our understanding of the relationship between intellectual and cultural 
production in the East and West must be dismantled in order for an original critique of 
the modern political system to be produced, and for that critique to result in a movement 
of social and political change. His goal is to develop what could be called “indigenous” 
conception of democracy; a conception of democracy which might transcend 
Orientalism, in the sense that it delinks notions of intellectual hierarchy from its synthesis 
of political concepts.  
 Other attempts to describe Ocalan’s political thought, despite proffering important 
contributions, have failed to recognize the underlying significance of his work by not 
positioning within a larger universe of competing conceptions of the political. The unique 
genealogy of Öcalan’s texts, in both structure and content, resemble integrate elements of 
anarchism as expressed in the works of the Russian anarchist philosophy Peter Kropotkin 
and the Bronx born social ecologist Murray Bookchin. However, Ocalan additionally 
integrates a critical understanding of both capitalism and ideology expressed in the works 
of Fernand Braudel, the philosopher of science Feuerabend, the French political 
anthropologist Pierre Clastres, and the democratic theories Leslie Lipson. In attempting 
to elucidate the genealogy of Öcalan’s political ideas, I do not intend to accuse his theory, 
as Orientalists have, of being derivative, or his processes to be lacking innovation.  
Instead, I hope to demonstrate how his synthesis of a variety of modern thinkers allows 
for the construction of his theses regarding what he refers to as “democratic civilization”, 
a concept which in Öcalan’s mind, must be decoupled from Western practices of 
representative democracy, which despite their accomplishments, failed to deliver the 
 
 
 31 
promises of democratic civilization to mankind. Öcalan presents the Kurdish case as 
merely on example of the failure of liberal democracy to resolve the fundamental 
problems of human political organization.  
 
It is noteworthy that the emergence of an avowedly anti-statist movement in the 
Middle East, based on a deep critique of the structural nature of the modern secular state, 
can be understood as consequence of certain uninvestigated notions inherent in modern 
governance, regarding which other scholars have already written. Saba Mahmood for 
example, in her study of Egyptian secularism, has argued convincingly that the 
emergence of religious minorities is a structural feature of secular governance.  
 
“While Islamic concepts and practices are crucial to the production of this 
inequality, I argue that the modern state and its political rationalist have 
played a far more decisive role in transforming preexisting religious 
differences, producing new forms of communal polarization, and making 
religion more rather than less salient to minority and majority identities 
alike.”27 
 
Although Mahmood’s study focused on Middle Eastern religious communities, the same 
argument may be applied with little modification to the case of the so called “ethnic”, 
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cultural or linguistic minorities. A prime feature of the modern state, a la Talal Asad and 
Saba Mahmood, is the dispensation of liberties on the basis of individual rights, an 
exercise it undertakes while simultaneously reserving the sovereign right to intervene in 
social and communal life in order to “ease” tensions created by the inevitable inequality 
created by unequal representation. Demands for minority rights expose minority 
communities to accusations of disloyalty to the state, as they must emphasize their 
differences from the national state identity in order to qualify for such “special 
protection.” The case of the Assyrians in Iraq, the Egyptian Copts, Arab Israelis (not to 
mention Palestinians) and critically in this study the case of the Kurds all testify to the 
inherent deficiencies in the rationale of the modern secular state.  
Consequently, the production of new intellectual vistas as well as an indigenous 
concept of democracy that decouples the concept of democracy from the institutions 
whose structural constraints have given rise to significant repression in the modern 
Middle East gains enormous significance for highlighting the failures of the state system, 
instituted in the Middle East by the colonial powers following World War I. Öcalan’s 
work is then an indigenous testament to the structural contradictions inherent in the state 
system, contradictions which can be found in any region of the world where states do not 
have the dubious fortune of an entirely homogenous society.   
ENTER OCALAN 
According to a biography of Öcalan published by the PKK, Öcalan was born in 
the village of Omerli, in south-eastern Turkey, before completing a degree in political 
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science at the University of Ankara and joining the civil services in Diyarbakir. 
Influenced by the events of the 1971 coup and the continuing denial of Kurdish cultural 
rights in Turkey28, he subsequently founded the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in the village of Lice in Diyarbakir, in 1978. It was not until 
1984 that the PKK launched an armed insurgency in Turkey, by which time Öcalan was 
already living in Syria as a fugitive under the protection of the Syrian government, which, 
due to its tense relationship with Turkey and own strategic interests in subduing its native 
Kurdish population, feigned sympathy for the exiled leader. 
Like many other countries of the region, Turkey’s relationship with its minorities, 
particularly the Kurds, has oscillated between feigned tolerance and open hostility. The 
launch of hostilities against the Turkish government by the PKK began in 1984, 
following the passage of Law 2932 in 1983 which prohibited the use of the Kurdish 
Language, only repealed in 1999. Articles 141 142 and 163 of the penal code outlawed 
communist, pro-Kurdish or Islamist political organizing.29 The result of the Turkish 
government's campaign against the PKK included the deaths of an estimated 30-40,000 
people and the depopulation of some 2,500 hamlets.30 According to reports by Human 
Rights Watch and other human rights organizations, the PKK was also responsible for 
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significant violations, including “768 politically motivated assassinations.”31 However in 
the Turkish press, any mention of Öcalan or the PKK is prefaced by attaching sole and 
full responsibility to the Kurdish resistance for the 30-40,000 estimated deaths that have 
occurred since the beginning of the conflict in 1984, despite the fact that the vast majority 
of the victims were killed by the Turkish military junta and its successors, with support 
from the United States. Academic literature on the PKK is often littered with 
uninvestigated claims made by the Turkish government in its attempts to dismantle the 
organization, such as its involvement in the drug trade, where PKK members in Germany 
are accused of smuggling heroin. Even official reports admit that in fact, the PKK 
probably charges smugglers a tax to pass through territory over which it exercises de 
facto control, and tolerates the activity of drug smugglers rather than being directly 
involved in the trade itself.3233 
 The paragraph above is meant to demonstrate that even some of the basic facts 
regarding the history of the PKK, its ongoing activities, and those of its founders are the 
subject of considerable and impassioned dispute. The PKK is not the subject of this 
thesis, but the history of the YPD and various other Kurdish organizations which 
emerged to govern the autonomous DCNS in 2011 have been condemned for the 
ideological and alleged organizational associations with Öcalan and the PKK. These 
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claims have justified Turkish incursions into DCNS territory during Operation Olive 
Branch, during which the Turkish military shelled and invaded Afrin before threatening 
Manbij.34 Thus the question of what the YPD is and what its connections are to the PKK, 
in addition to understanding the ideological and political goals of both movements seem 
to be matter of significant international interest.  
Öcalan remained in Syria until October of 1998, where the government of Hafez 
al-Assad declined on numerous occasions to expel the rebel leader from Syria. In 1993, 
Prime Minister Demirel flew to Damascus to attempt to negotiate the surrender of Öcalan 
to no avail, as Assad opposed Turkish incursions into Iraqi territory in attempts to 
dismantle Kurdish camps.35 Under the Clinton administration, Turkey received 
significant military aid as an ally against Saddam Hussein, meaning the Americans 
readily turned a blind eye to mounting reports of human rights abuses and the cascading 
death toll.3637 As the de facto leader of the PKK in exile, Öcalan routinely called for 
negotiations, which the Turkish government consistently refused,38 preferring instead to 
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run a clandestine assassination campaign that erupted into a political scandal when an 
internal government report found that Turkish government officials were involved in the 
trade of illegal drugs and using casinos to launder the profits.39 However in October of 
1998, Turkey managed to convince Syria (by threatening military action against 
Damascus) to sign an agreement in which Syria pledged to cease its support for the PKK 
rebels and hand over Öcalan.40 
An international manhunt quickly followed, as Öcalan fled to Italy, where he was 
briefly detained before being released, when the Italian authorities refused to extradite 
him to Turkey.41 He then fled to Kenya, where, on February 15th of 1999, with the help 
of the CIA, he was captured and transported to Turkey to await trial.42 Öcalan was 
quickly sentenced to death. Following an appeal however, the European Court of Human 
Rights requested that his execution be postponed while it reviewed the case.43 Following 
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the Turkish government’s abolition of the death penalty in 2002, Öcalan’s sentence was 
commuted to life imprisonment.44 
According to the late Murray Bookchin’s daughter, in April of 2004, Öcalan 
contacted Bookchin from prison with the help of his German translator after reading 
Turkish translations of Bookchin’s works.45 Öcalan had begun working on a multi-
volume history of the Kurdish struggle in the Middle East that he would present to the 
European Court of Human Rights as his defense. The three volumes of the Prison 
Writings were published between 2007 and 2012, while the first two volumes of the four 
volume Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization were published in 2015. My analysis 
focuses on the Manifesto, as, while not differing very much in content, presents a more 
sophisticated arrangement and articulation of the various elements of Öcalan’s critique, 
which in a differing fashion are present in Prison Writings 
  Some scholarly attention has been given to the Öcalan’s work and its impact on 
the region, an effect which continues to manifest in unexpected ways. Knapp et al., for 
example posit an analysis of Öcalan’s work based on a reinterpretation of social contract 
theory, while Hunt (2017) and Gerber et al. (2018) provided overviews of the connection 
between Bookchin’s concept of social ecology and Öcalan’s notion of democratic 
federalism. Housseini (2016) and Can (2016) both suggest that the “Rojava revolution” 
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can function as an alternate mode of development in the Middle East, creating a paradigm 
shift away from the centralized and authoritarian state structures that have dominated 
Middle Eastern political life in the modern era.46  
Many of the most essential elements of Öcalan’s thought remain unexamined and 
deserve scholarly attention as, despite Öcalan’s Western influences, his synthesis 
constitutes a significant development in the quest for a resolution regarding the 
“problem” of political minorities in the Middle East. While Öcalan’s critique and 
synthesis casts a wide net, eventually drawing in the instrumentality of modern sciences 
and the subjugation of women, the foundational element of the Manifesto is a critique of 
the nation-state which reflects an understanding of the its underlying discursive elements 
described in the introduction.  
DECONSTRUCTING THE NATION-STATE 
Although Öcalan critique of the nation state rests partially within the works of 
major anarchist thinkers like Kropotkin, as well as Murray Bookchin, who articulated the 
theory of social ecology and democratic confederalism beginning in the 70’s, his critique 
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reflects a larger synthesis of postmodern critique, incorporating the works of the French 
historian and forerunner of systems-theory, Fernand Braudel. Öcalan proposed in The 
Roots of Civilization, the first volume of his defense before the European Human Rights 
Court, that “the body most resistant to democratic change is the state itself - to a large 
extent caused by its deeply rooted institutions and traditions, as old as civilization 
itself.”47 As suggested earlier in the discussion of articulations of democracy as the 
institutionalization of certain forms of statecraft which seek to recraft the individual in 
the image of the state, this approach was relevant to Ocalan because of the particular 
ways in which the attempt to use liberal statecraft to create national identities in the 
Middle East has failed. In Prison Writings, Ocalan writes that  
 
“The initial development of the structures and establishments that make 
up a complex body politic doubtless amounts to a significant turning point in the 
history of humankind for all its negative and positive consequences. After all, any 
contemporary state shares its functional institutions with its Sumerian 
prototype.48 
 
What is striking about Ocalan’s approach is the attempt to articulate Asad’s critique of 
liberal governance in a wider historical approach. The “body politic” for Ocalan 
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constitutes a construct of a statecraft whose origins have a deeper historical meaning. In 
contrast to the typical European historiography which traces emancipatory foundations of 
liberal governance to the overthrow of religiously based monarchies, Ocalan suggests 
rather than there is more continuity between the modern state and its historical 
antecedent. Consistent with arguments set out in Prison Writings, which Öcalan’ 
submitted to the European Court of Human Rights as Öcalan’ as his defense, in the first 
volume of the Manifesto he claims that “Just as Western Europe has turned the modern 
world into a cultural expansion region over the past four hundred years it was once the 
region of expansion of, initially the Neolithic culture from the Fertile Crescent, then the 
Roman civilization and finally the Christian revolution.”49 
Öcalan conception of various manifestations of human political organization are 
informed by a shared hierarchical notion of power which was introduced through 
Sumerian culture. The historical critique he proffers aims to demonstrate first, the roots 
of hierarchical state power, which constitute the source of the democratic crisis through 
which modern society is passing,50 and second, the instrumentalist notions of knowledge 
and society which arose throughout their development. Democratic confederalism is 
intended then as both an ideological reconfiguration and a institutional reimagination of 
forms of liberal state craft that require the hierarchical configuration of the body politic 
which Ocalan critiques as fundamentally oppressive. 
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Öcalan was influenced in adopting this historical approach by Fernand Braudel’s 
notion of la longue durée. The historiographical approach introduced by the Annales 
school sought to identify long term patterns in the societal structures, often by 
challenging histographically construct notions of “breaks” between different periods 
which attempt to starkly periodize different historical epochs. For Ocalan, the history of 
the state a la longue durée  “implies the period starting with the end of the fourth ice age 
and ending when it can no longer continue its physical existence due to some natural or 
nuclear disaster.”51 Societies in this view cannot be viewed merely in terms of institutions 
and events, but are rather constituted by this longue durée society, which is evidence by 
historical memory contained in religious texts and ancient practices which persist despite 
a changing political and sociological landscape. Many institutions, such as the 
hierarchical modern state, have evolved from forms of hierarchical social organization 
that arose in early societies.52 
In section three, Öcalan moves from presenting his analytic framework to 
analyzing the formation of class society in the Sumerian state. He traces the origin of 
class society to the “administration of the city which formed the initial bureaucratic 
cast”53this was achieved as the priests presented themselves as the deputies of God” and 
by their monopoly on science.” Through this analysis he can claim that “the foundations 
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of science or lead during Neolithic period.” In his analysis then the ziggurat becomes the 
symbol of the “hierarchical class-based society, whose lowest level were the workers. 
However, in conversation with Bookchin, who writes that  
“The State, in the authentically finished, historically complete form we 
find today, could have emerged only after traditional societies, customs, and 
sensibilities were so thoroughly reworked to accord with domination that 
humanity lost all sense of contact with the organic society from which it 
originated.”54, 
Öcalan’s goal is to identify and distinguish different societal tendencies within a 
Braudelian society whose transformation to hierarchical state structure can explain the 
current structural failings of Middle East statehood. Drawing on the work of Maria Mies, 
who writes of “gynocentrism” in early patriarchies, he argues that the subordination of 
women constitutes an essential feature of capitalistic instrumentalism, which transforms 
conceptions of environments from integrated ecologies into loose matter to be used in 
production processes. 
“The role of women had at a previous stage been more important as 
demonstrated by the prevalence of the mother goddess religion55 and 
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interpretation of the female goddesses as guardians of Sumerian city states. 
However overtime the role of women became less important, as a male beast 
hierarchical bureaucratic Society was developed. Women now was an official 
public and private prostitute as well as a slave.56 
“is the way for society itself to be enslaved thereafter all enslavement was based on 
housewifization.”57 
The notion of a transformed Sumerian society is echoed in Ecology of Freedom, 
where Bookchin, citing the scholar of ancient Sumer Henri Frankfort, writes that “the 
earliest city-states were managed by equalitarian assemblies...as the city states began to 
expand, the power to wage war was conferred on an ensi or great man.”58 Borrowing this 
point from Bookchin, Öcalan suggests that the process of territorial expansion lead to the 
collapse of egalitarian institutions in early Sumerian culture that were preserved by their 
Neolithic Forerunners. 
“After expanding upon the development of colonies which serve to provide 
their mother cities with raw materials goods and axes to trade in far-flung 
regions key to our analysis of physical rocks we can conclude the beginning of the 
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Sumerian society was also beginning of the era of masked gods and disguised 
Kings.”59 
The development of patriarchal dynastic structures also heralded a subversion of 
earlier gynocentrism that pervaded Sumerian society. Following the subordination of 
women’s work, “thereafter all enslavement was based on housewifization.”60 He also 
ascribes to patriarchy the tendency of early Sumerians position to develop dynastic 
structures, stating that the reason why republic and democratic systems have not 
developed in the Middle East is because “the initial states were based on theocracy and 
dynasties.”61  
Ocalan’s problematization of the state rests fundamentally on the power of 
hierarchical structures to shape and mediate the historical subject in order to manufacture 
political legitimacy. While Talal Asad suggests this is a feature of the modern liberal 
state, Ocalan’s critique suggests it is a function of all state structures throughout history. 
Of interest in particular is the deployment of Braudel’s notion of la longue duree as a way 
of articulating a historical continuity between the premodern hierarchical state and the 
modern state. This ideological realization, the realization that previous iterations of the 
PKK had been trapped in a dialectical relationship to state power, constituted an 
important ideological shift which had far reaching impact for the PKK. For example in 
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2002, Ocalan published a volume of essays under the name Çeteciliğe Karşı Mücadele 
(The Struggle Against Partisanism) 
 “Understanding recent developments in the PKK as a new historical period in the 
Kurds and Kurdistan carries great importance.  Real socialism and its organizational 
habits, which have moved in its initial ideological genesis, began to show its true face 
during this period.”62 
Although at this period he had developed doubts regarding the power of real 
socialism as a vehicle for political change, this earlier text contains somewhat less 
discussion of his later articulation of democracy. Nevertheless it suggests that the 
disillusionment with real socialism began when the PKK realized that struggle against the 
Turkish state during the State of Emergency would not achieve the transformation they 
hoped for. Democracy had to be a vehicle, but it had to be an articulation of democracy 
which not concede to the state the discursive power to define the rules of the game.63 
It behooves at this point in the discussion to pause to discuss why the historical 
approach employed by Öcalan allows an ideological escape valve from the constraints of 
dialectical materialism, which had provided the motivating ideology of the PKK since the 
beginning of its armed struggle in 1984. In volume 1 of Prison Writings, Öcalan writes 
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that “It is time we acknowledge that an unwavering belief in scientific socialism does not 
automatically acquire analytical and rational guidelines for action, - any belief that turns 
into dogmatism, even if originally built on a scientific basis, obstructs our view on 
reality.”64 Bookchin’s work on social ecology provided an alternative methodological 
structure based on fusing research in history, anthropology, archeology and biology into 
naturalistic vision of human political behavior. This strain of thinking, which runs 
parallel but methodologically distinct from theoretical approaches to liberal political 
science represented by the legacies of the likes of Hobbes, Kant, Rousseau, Locke, as 
well as the legacy of Marx and his adherents, is better represented by Proudhon, Bakunin, 
and Peter Kropotkin. Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid, was an attempt to fight social Darwinism 
by assembling research by naturalist and biologists to demonstrate the centrality of 
mutual aid over competition in the survival of species. However, as we will see in 
volume 2, Öcalan’s thought introduces major innovations to traditional anarchist thinking 
and moreover, requires analytic consideration in light of the changed circumstances of 
social development that constitute “late modernity”, where class struggle in and of itself 
has to a certain degree lost theoretical and practical relevance. This explains Öcalan’s 
departure from the affected scientism of Marxist thought, as well as his critique of the 
provincial nature of early anarchist political theory, which attempted to naturalize 
material relations without critically engaging their ideological substructure. The failure to 
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abandon materialistic notions of progress, which Marxism embraces, was a major 
shortcoming of early social theorists which condemned them to a Hobbesian war of all 
against all.  
Thus despite the influence of Marxist critics of capitalist modernity and 
enlightenment thinking by members of the Frankfurt School, throughout his analysis 
Öcalan maintains that ”a critique that focuses only on capitalist modernity will not lead to 
progress.” Moreover he presents a critique of Marxism by suggesting that because class 
societies are a constituent to feature of civilization “it is extremely rare if not impossible, 
that’s a revolution is achieved through the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat 
as in a few cases in which this has occurred” the new administration has usually been far 
worse then the previous oppressive and exploitative regime.”65 
What then constitutes the main ideological departure that convinces Öcalan of the 
unworthiness of Marxist dogma? He suggests that the early socialists, though cognizant 
of the centrality of hierarchy and patriarchy to the modern structures of bourgeois 
capitalism, chose rather to harness its revolutionary potential than subvert its legacy. 
“The founders of Socialism came to power through the culture of civilized 
society. Although they claimed to oppose this bloody exploitative heritage and 
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claimed that they refuse to become a power resting upon it they fully embraced 
it.”66 
In other words, real socialism implicitly accepts the hierarchical nature of civilized 
society and weaponizes it in order to promote the class struggle - socialism thus suffered 
from historical short-sightedness which Öcalan attempts correct. Moreover, real 
socialism as praxis was constructed upon philosophical and ontological assumptions that 
remained unchallenged.  For example, he points out that Marx’s notion of the exchange 
value of a commodity, as described in Volume 1 of Capital, fundamentally accepts the 
subject-object dichotomy of German idealism. “The opinion that the exchange value of a 
commodity can be measured by the workers labor has initiated a conceptualization period 
fraught with disadvantages.  – the mental acceptance of the society’s commodification is 
to abandon being human.” While this attitude is reflected in the works of Hans Jonas, 
Adorno and others, it is best expressed in Bookchin’s Ecology of Freedom, in his 
discussion of the animistic attitude of premodern production practices.    
“But not only was the natural "object" (living or not) a subject in its own 
right; so, too, were the tools that mediated the relationship between the workers 
and the material on which they worked. The "labor process" itself assumed the 
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organic character of a unified activity in which work appeared as an element in a 
gestative process-literally an act of reproduction, of birth.”67 
 Marx’s analysis of capital ultimately failed to recognize that any reconfiguration 
of social relations or the production process that implicitly accepted the subject-object 
dichotomy as a fundamental philosophical or scientific assumption could not undermine 
modern instrumental metaphysics. This is a recognition Öcalan’ picks up from the 
Frankfurt school; “The abstract self, which alone confers the legal right to record and 
systematize, is confronted by nothing but abstract material, which has no other property 
than to be the substrate of that right.”68  
Thus the exploration of premodern metaphysics provides both a historical route to 
understanding the genesis of hierarchical or “state civilization” as Öcalan refers to it in 
Volume 2, as well as an escape route for theorizing what Öcalan refers to as “democratic 
civilization” which has a fundamentally different ontology. As contrasted with Öcalan’s 
history of the development and expansion of Sumerian civilizations and the cultures that 
it influenced of inculcated, Neolithic society was a “completely moral society” – 
“Sharing and solidarity amongst themselves were the fundamental principle of their 
morality – a morality that sustained the society.”69 The stability of Neolithic society, 
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which persisted for thousands of years, was due to the fact that its “ideological and 
material cultures seemed to have been in harmony with nature.”70  
A major point to which Öcalan’s gives clarification is an answer to the question of 
why morally based faiths could not challenge the development of material culture 
promoted by capitalist civilization. He writes  
“The ground for capitalism might have been prepared intentionally or 
unintentionally by bringing the gigantic empires to collapse and by the 
monotheistic systems not turning their aims and structures into civilizational 
constructs”71 
This, according to Öcalan, is due to the fact that the morally based faiths, which 
revolted against what they viewed as oppressive civilizations, sought only to promote 
their ideological culture, rather than attack the material foundations of the civilizations 
they inculcated. Religion was used as a mask to justify the expansion of material culture, 
however for Öcalan “these conflicts have their origins in civilization, and religion is only 
used as their disguise.” 
Öcalan concludes Volume One with the assertion that “the main conflict is not 
only one of class division but as one at civilizational level. The historical struggle that 
can be traced back to at least five thousand years is essentially one between state-
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civilization and democratic civilization: the latter consisting of pre-state village and 
agricultural communities. All ideological military, political and economic relationships, 
conflicts and struggles occur under these two main systems of civilization.”72 
Two issues are at stake with regards to understanding the intellectual history of 
modern political movements in the Middle East. One is to reclaim the notion of 
intellectual indigeneity which has been used to disparage Eastern thought from the 
perspective of Western academics and Orientalists. The other is, through the exploration 
of Öcalan’s ideas which are the consequence not only of outside intellectual influences 
but additional the experience of revolutionary praxis, to understand the structural 
constraints and failures which explain the emergence of a radical anti-statist movement in 
the heart of the Middle East. Ocalan’s critique reflects an understanding that traditional 
modes of revolution in the Marxist Leninist model accept the state as the justifiable 
vehicle for revolution.  
However, the state’s hegemonic power over the creation of historical selves 
recursively creates subordinated and therefore, undemocratic subjects. This is not merely 
an arcane issue of political emancipation, it is a fundamental contradiction within the 
discursive structure of liberal statecraft, as critique by Assad. In order to grant political 
rights, the state uses various methods of coercion to reconstruct a manageable civilian 
subject. The attack on collective identity outside of the structure of the state then 
becomes a fundamental feature of modern state governance, one that is shared by real 
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socialist states, who employed innumerable coercive tactics to construct an obedient 
socialist subject. Ocalan’s critique is fundamentally an attempt to describe the historical 
foundations of this civilization problem and its consequences for crafting a “democratic 
civilization.” 
 Chapter 2 deals with Volume 2 of Öcalan’s Manifesto, before transitioning to a 
history of the PYD and other political parties which have attempted to put Öcalan’s 
thought into practice in Northern Syria during the Rojavan Revolution.  
 
 
Chapter 2: Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization Volume 2: 
Capitalism 
 
“The Greco Roman culture and civilization is wrongly interpreted as the 
start of Western culture. This culture and civilization did not emerge in the west 
or Europe for it to be called Western culture or civilization. All the major cultural 
milestones including the Christian medieval period, have their origin in the 
Middle Eastern cultures and civilizations, that is, in Mesopotamia and Egypt. We 
are trying to establish how a daisy-chain of a culture originating from a specific 
location and formed within the scope of Braudel’s longue durée of fifteen 
thousand years has been funneled into Europe.” 
-Abdullah Öcalan, Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization 
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“Our entire modern world is trapped in the net of Alexandrian culture and 
recognizes as its ideal the theoretical man, equipped with the highest intellectual 
powers and working in the service of science, a man for whom Socrates is the 
prototype and progenitor.” 
-Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 
 
In Restating Orientalism, Wael Hallaq writes of his agreement with Charles 
Taylor’s critique of the Is/Ought distinction,73 which was echoed by the French 
Orientalist Rene Guenon, who in the essay “A Material Civilization”, writes  
“The moderns, generally speaking, cannot conceive of any other science 
except that which deals with things that can be measured, counted, or weighed, 
material things that is to say, since it is to these alone that the quantitative point of 
view is applicable; and the claim to reduce quality to quantity is most 
characteristic of modern science.”74 
In taking up a critique of scientism, which Öcalan distinguishes from science 
itself, both Guenon and Öcalan inaugurate a need for methodological approaches to 
understanding human society which do not arbitrarily isolate whole realms of knowledge 
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(religious knowledge, in the case of Hallaq,) to secondary status. Öcalan’s attack on 
scientism was influenced by his reading of the philosopher Paul Feyerabend. Like 
Bookchin, Kropotkin, and Bakunin, Feyerabend presents a critique of primitivistic 
interpretations developed in modern anthropology, of prehistoric civilization, expressed 
in his Philosophy of Nature. Feyerabend’s arguably most important work, Against 
Method, opens with the famous line “Every culture, every nation, can build a science that 
fits its own particular needs.” In doing so Feyerabend sought to demonstrate what 
Foucault and other philosopher’s have described as the problematic relationship between 
knowledge and power which pervades modern scientific thinking, and its dogmatic 
methodology which occludes sciences which are constructed for non materialist or non 
instrumentalist means.  
  The Turkish translation of Science in a Free Society attained popularity in Turkey 
among both Islamists and members of the Turkish Left,75 and plays a critical role in the 
development of Öcalan’s thought. Influenced by the work of Feyerabend, Öcalan 
challenges the hegemony of western scientific discourse and thinking, and by converse, 
the inferiority of Islamic or Middle Eastern intellectual traditions, by demystifying the 
ideological underpinnings of the practice of western science, which is inevitably drawn 
into the exercise of state power and interstate competition, including its critical role 
within capitalism. The central thesis of Science in a Free Society is “that there must be a 
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formal separation between state and science just as there is now a formal separation 
between state and church.”76 
However these philosophers also proposed a deeper problem with modern 
scientific thinking, namely, the ideological construction of man as the center of science. 
In the conclusion of The Order of Things, cited by Öcalan, Foucault writes, “As the 
archeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one 
perhaps nearing its end.”  Foucault suggested that the current episteme, which constitutes 
the boundaries and organization of modern thought, played a role in constructing man as 
the central object of scientific inquiry, and he suggested that this tenuous situation would 
soon come to an end, that civilizational progress would require a new episteme.77 
Yet a critical issue emerges, namely the association between critiques of 
modernity and reactionary Islamism. It is theoretically and historically obtuse to suggest 
that all Islamist critiques are fundamentally reactionary, as this dialectic has been used to 
discredit Islamic reform based in legitimate and communitarian ethics. At the same time, 
Feyerabend’s work, translated into Turkish, has been instrumental in Islamist polemics 
against the Kemalist regime in Turkey. This has resulted in the perception of the 
“exploitation” of postmodernist critiques of modernity by Islamist thinkers, 
contrapuntally exposing leftist critics of modernity in Turkey to the same accusations of 
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constructing modernity as a totalizing boogeyman, and narrowing the opportunity to 
construct critiques of Kemalist Turkey that proffer legitimate critiques of capitalism 
without sinking into reactionary or reductive alternatives.78 As I suggest in Chapter 1 
regarding Lauziere’s work on Salafism, the employment of European thinkers in an 
indigenous critique of the nation state system in the Middle East raises anew the specter 
of “intellectual indigeneity,” accusing the oriental intellectual of either borrowing from or 
reacting to Western intellectual innovations. Thus in constructing a critique of the nation 
state, Öcalan is faced with a challenge of navigating the Symplegades constituted by the 
constant standoff between discourses of modernity and their retractors. As suggested by 
the epigraph presented in the beginning of this chapter, Öcalan’s historiographical and 
philosophical approach is not simply a regurgitation of previously iterated theories, but 
rather a synthesis of radical social ecology, enlightenment critique, political anthropology 
and longue durée historiography.  
The second volume of Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization begins with a 
Feyerabend's assault on the “scientific method.” Given that this volume is devoted to a 
critique of capitalism, Öcalan prefaces the introduction to this endeavor by discussing the 
failures of Marxism to provide an alternative system to capitalism. He suggests for 
example, that Marx failed to anticipate the way in which his work would be used to 
justify, albeit via different routes, the expansion of capitalism, such as China’s 
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authoritarianism.79 According to Öcalan, we can attribute this to the “scientific” basis of 
real socialism, which is constituted by the same metaphysics as capitalism.  
A point of clarification regarding Feyerabend’s principal contribution in Against 
Method: The distinction between intellectual and civilizational progress, advocated by 
Öcalan, and a dogmatic defense of the status-quo, is the distinction between science as 
part of an exploratory and inquisitive attitude towards human society and natural events 
which seeks to sincerely further human progress. The devolution of scientific inquiry into 
scientism, in which the production of results and the exploitation of ecological systems 
constituted science’s marriage with the state, was Feyerabend’s chief concern. “The 
hardest task needs the lightest hand or else its completion will not lead to freedom but to 
a tyranny much worse than the one it replaces.”80 
We would consequently err to associate Öcalan’s critique of scientism with the 
“reactionary” attitudes associated with Islamist critiques of capitalist modernity, the 
problematics of which I mention in my discussion of Lauziere. Öcalan suggests rather 
that the root of the conflict between the proposed categories of Western Rationalism and 
Islam lie not in a rejection of the latter to accede to civilizational progress, but rather a 
legitimate concern regarding the metaphysical, or rather lack of true metaphysical 
outlook inherent in modern scientific practice.  Thus he writes “Science based on the 
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subject object dichotomy is nothing but the legitimation of slavery...capitalism does not 
advanced science it only makes use of it.”81 
The efforts of Marxists in undermining the class-based hierarchies failed to their 
failure in recognizing that “in the historical rise of capitalism a leading role is given to 
rationalism a branch of Western thinking that emerge concurrently with capitalism.”82 
Similar to Feyerabend’s assertions in Against Method, Öcalan suggests that analytical 
intelligence emerged to occlude and suppress other ways of imagining intelligence and a 
“scientific” manner of organizing society. “If we look at how even in primitive lifeforms 
organize we can catch a glimpse of a marvelous element of intelligence.”83 The attitude 
however of the rationalists was to dissolve the organic linkages between human intellect 
and other forms of organic intelligence, a sin committed by capitalists and Marxists alike. 
‘The worst metaphysical approach is positivism with its attempt to explain the 
phenomenon of human being by separating and detaching it from the universe.” 84 
Öcalan’s critique and the “epistemic break”, to use Bachelard’s term that occurred 
within the Kurdish liberation movement has often been associated with a shift from 
violent to nonviolent means, or an acceptance and acquiescence to the Turkish state, or 
the shift from a Leninist model of violently opposing state power to  confederalist model 
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of building competing democratic institutions that dissolve the state from within.85 
However the emergence  of this anti-statist model deserves to be linked to both the 
influence of postmodern thinkers whose works were translated and widely read within 
Turkey as well as the historical development of the Kurdish struggle. The shift towards 
democratic confederalism as revolutionary model has not, in fact lead to a decrease in 
violent confrontation between the state and Kurdish elements, as demonstrated by the 
Turkish invasion of Afrin.   
The instrumental nature of modern science however, cannot be separated from the 
development of religious institutions and praxis within Europe. According to Öcalan, 
“Philosophy and science bear profound traces of religion.”86 However he accuses the 
“capitalist mentality” of separating science from philosophy and religion, again invoking 
Feyerabend’s work in arguing that science cannot or ought not be separated from notions 
of ethical practice which in and of themselves cannot be objectively found, but must be 
designed to suit the needs of the community applying the science.  
Thus it was (secular) Protestantism , as proposed by Max Weber, that “prepared 
the mental grounds for capitalism and morally gave free passage to it.”87 In attempting to 
draw on other intellectual traditions which explain the rise of capitalism, Öcalan seeks to 
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position the shortcoming of Marx’s critique in a metaphysical attitude whose intent was 
to provide a “scientific” analysis of capitalism, overlooking the fact that basis of his 
hermeneutics, based in Hegelian idealism, provided an opening for and lead to the 
foundation of the German nation state, and indeed influenced a number of other 
nationalist thinkers from Ziya Gokalp to Michel Aflaq, by reifying in socialist praxis a 
materialistic and therefore anti-metaphysical historical outlook.  
By contrast, modern philosophy in the Nietzschean tradition (Deleuze, Foucault) 
provided more substantive critique of capitalism by surpassing the limits of Kant’s 
idealism. However these works have largely failed to make an appreciable impact on 
changing attitudes towards capitalism, by failing to articulate a concrete political 
alternative, instead focused on providing specific critiques to various aspects of capitalist 
modernity.88 In his section on “economism,” he critiques the scientific attitude taken both 
by capitalist economists as well as Marxists, pointing out that the attempt to develop a 
scientific critique of capitalism obfuscated the fact that economics itself was a discipline 
designed to provide theoretical justification for capitalism, and thus could not be used to 
present a critique surpassing the limits of its own domain.89 Moreover, by reifying a 
pseudo-scientific approach to understanding capitalism, Öcalan understands these 
approaches to fundamentally limit the possibilities of reforming society. Thus, he not 
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only steers clear of but, in fact, openly indicts ideas like class struggle, writing that “The 
common opportunistic trend is to first acknowledge and define the masters and then to 
propose struggle to its servants. This is indeed the mindset that has frustrated all rights 
and labor struggles throughout history.”90 By this he suggests that critiques of capitalism 
have neither achieved their goal of undermining the fundamental ideological assumptions 
that give rise to capitalist cultures, nor properly examined history in la longue durée a la 
Braudel in order to understand the civilizational “daisy chain” by which hierarchical 
structures emerging in the destruction of Neolithic society were imported into European 
capitalist modernity.  
In order to demonstrate further that early civilization was not, as Marxists and 
other materialist philosophers presume, inevitably destined for capitalist modernity, he 
points to early evidence from studies of Sumerian society, in particular an analysis of The 
Epic of Gilgamesh, which he interprets as “depicting the struggle between the communal 
mother-based order or society, and the hierarchic patriarchal society.” Scholars have 
overlooked however that the very title of Öcalans work is a reference to Leslie Lipsons 
1964 work the Democratic Civilization, in which Lipson presents an elegant critique of 
the modern nation state as ill-suited to serve the increasingly complex problems of global 
society – “The nation state has become as ill-adapted to modern needs and therefore as 
surely doomed to disappear as the polis of the Greeks to the age of Philip and 
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Alexander.”  The parallels in modes of thinking and the attempt to reformulate the 
concept of democracy from its limited interpretation as a normative constitutional system 
establishing a statist society, are evident in Lesli Lipson’s work. After surveying the 
classical literature Lipson attests that the criteria of Greek democracy as understood by 
the Greeks was “Rule by the poor, exploitation of the rich, abolition of debt slavery and 
property qualifications for office, opportunity for individual talent irrespective of family 
status or wealth, etc.”91 
Lipson identifies two factors in American politics which mirror to a greater or 
lesser extent those in Turkish politics, namely the importance of what is referred to as 
race relations (acknowledging the lack of any scientific basis for the notion of race) and 
what she refers to as the “power and prestige of commercial values”92 She writes, 
claiming that her goal has been not to simply analyze the features of the democratic state, 
but to “interpret the spirit of democracy” – that  
 
“These (democratic) principles constitute a central feature of the 
democratic state and the values they embody give its quality to the democratic 
civilization. In a democratic milieu the power which the government must wiled is 
not simply to be understood in behavioral terms as a process of certain 
determinate person reaching specific decisions on particular subjects. For that 
                                                 
91 L. Lipson, The Democratic Civilization., 1st US-1st Printing edition (Oxford University Press, 
1964).page 36 
92 {Updating} page 42 
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power is what the community has sanctioned through competition between 
alternative parties and policies and allows to be used in order to alter existing 
realities in the hope for something better. Power must therefore be understood in 
relation to the conditions which create it and the purposes to which it is 
directed.” 93 
 
In short, to understand democracy as merely the institution of representative 
institutions, is to rob from democracy its moral and philosophical underpinnings, which 
are to guide society to civilization – this approach views any end or policy sanctioned by 
whatever means by a voting public – as democratic by virtue of process, ignoring that 
ostensibly democratic institutions, particularly in countries like Turkey, have been 
directed at times to support the wholesale slaughter of those considered to be an inferior 
race under the ideology of nationalism.  
Öcalan adapts Lipson’s critique in a more radical interpretation by conceiving of 
statist civilization and democratic civilization as antithetical and competing modes of 
development.  “During this (early) stage in all societies we witness a similar 
contradiction: the democratic society and civilized society contradiction; or in more 
understandable and concrete terms, the contradiction of state and democracy”94 
                                                 
93 Lipson. page 54 
94 Öcalan, Abdullah, and Radha D’Souza. Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 2. Translated 
by Havin Guneser. Place of publication not identified: New Compass Press, 2017. page 112 
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In many respects this thesis draws on the European anarchist tradition, however 
Öcalan, adapting it to his own purposes, presents a rarely cited example from the history 
of Early Islam, where the struggle to establish a republican democracy or a Islamic 
sultanate lead to early schisms among Muslims. “The tribal aristocracy wanted a 
sultanate similar to that of the Byzantines and Sassanids.”95 Öcalan contrast this with “the 
struggle over whether the (Athenian) society should be a democratic or a civilized 
society” Consistent with the Frankfurt school and Braudel’s bottom up view of material 
history,96 Öcalan defines civilization as the process of imposing ideological and 
economic superstructures on the underlying democratic and material cultures, a pattern 
which reemerges continually throughout history. 
“Democracy is based mostly upon the substratum majority and multitudes 
that have been betrayed, oppressed and exploited mostly by the hierarchic upper-
strata, whereas civilization is based mostly on the section of the upper strata that 
pursue the oppression exploitation and ideological hegemony.” 
Öcalan’s democratic civilization, like Lipson, is one which rejects the hierarchical 
structure of the state as a tool for imposing capitalism on the substratum majority in 
direct contradiction to natural democratic impulses. - calling for “political theory to at 
least determine and define a state that is open to democracy, that is, a state that does not 
                                                 
95 Öcalan, Abdullah, and Radha D’Souza. Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 2. Translated 
by Havin Guneser. Place of publication not identified: New Compass Press, 2017. page 112 
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ban real democracy or consider itself to be the epitome of democracy”97  This attempt to 
decouple “state” and “civilization” from society, was influentially presented by Pierre 
Clastres in his famous collection of essays. He writes 
“Primitive societies are societies without a State. This factual judgment, 
accurate in itself, actually hides an opinion, a value judgment that immediately 
throws doubt on the possibility of constituting political anthropology as a strict 
science. What the statement says, in fact, is that primitive societies are missing 
something - the State - that is essential to them, as it is to any other society: our 
own, for instance. Consequently, those societies are incomplete; they are not quite 
true societies - they are not civilized - their existence continues to suffer the 
painful experience of a lack - the lack of a State - which, try as they may, they will 
never make up.”98 
Clastres’s insights were influential in Öcalan’s development of the concept of 
democratic civilization in contrast with statist civilization. Moreover, the influence of 
Clastres’s work, which marked a major turn in anthropology at the time, constitutes a 
significant advance over the work of the Frankfurt School, which in keeping with the 
academic consensus at the time, viewed hierarchical organizations as originating in 
                                                 
97 Öcalan, Abdullah, and Radha D’Souza. Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 2. Translated 
by Havin Guneser. Place of publication not identified: New Compass Press, 2017. page 116 
98 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology, trans. Robert Hurley and 
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“primitive” divisions of labor between men and woman.99 “The error of Adorno is 
reflecting patriarchal attitudes informed by Marxism onto a society which perhaps had 
none - division of labor in and of itself is not a patriarchal endeavor, only when it is 
infused with power relations along the lines of gender does it acquire its hierarchical 
meaning.”100 In this revised anthropological outlook, the development of “state 
civilization” and consequently capitalism can be traced through the shared inheritance of 
a diachronic chain of civilizations sharing similar structures.  
Thus, Öcalan distinguishes what he calls “Democratic Civilization” as a 
teleological period beyond the modern era, in which the hierarchies adopted from 
preexisting Sumerian, Egyptian, Classical and European societies are overcome. “The 
fundamental contradiction is between the civilization with state monopoly and the 
democratic civilization of stateless society. This difference between the state civilization 
and civilization with democracy can best be seen in the two ancient Greek city-states of 
Sparta, administered by monarch, and Athens, administered by democracy.”101 
Öcalan’s changed views of the role of state and its relationship to Braudelian 
notion of economy appear to be instrumental in his radically changed perspective 
regarding the proper course of revolutionary action. Whereas the Leninist model calls 
                                                 
99 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. page 16 “The men tracked prey while the women 
performed tasks which did not require rigid commands. How much violence preceded the habituation to 
even so simple an order can- nor be known. In that order the world was already divided into zones of power 
and of the profane.” 
100 Öcalan and D’Souza, Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 2. page 154 
101 Öcalan, Abdullah, and Radha D’Souza. Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 2. Translated 
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upon revolutionaries to take control of the state by force in order to dismantle class 
oppression, promising in turn that because the state is a tool of class oppression, by 
instituting the dictatorship of the proletariat, the state will “wither away”, as its raison 
d’être vanishes, 102 Öcalan’s view is that the state can only be a tool for imposing 
economic monopolies in the Braudelian sense. Consequently, as has seemingly been 
demonstrated by numerous historical examples, particularly the Russian and French 
cases, it is only when state power is dissolved through the establishment of competing, 
democratic institutions outside the states purview (i.e. democratic councils) that state 
power and its economic monopoly can be simultaneously undermined.103 However how 
can we contrast this with the anarchist notions proposed by Proudhon, Bakunin and 
Kropotkin? He objects to the anarchist tradition lying within the critique of state power 
for failing to identify the multiplicity of factors and aims for which states are instituted, 
particularly its connection to the enforcement of capitalism. “The definition of the state as 
an art of administration and management is as dangerous as moral interpretations because 
it ignores all the other factors and disguises the real essence of the state.”104 
This definition of the state as “statecraft” or a “tool of management” closely 
reflects the view of Talal Asad and Huntington. Huntington and Schumpeter admit and 
                                                 
102 See Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin, The State and Revolution (Penguin Books Limited, 1992). “In striving for 
socialism, however, we are convinced that it will develop into communism and, therefore, that the need for 
violence against people in general, for the subordination of one man to another, and of one section of the 
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elementary conditions of social life without violence and without subordination.” 
103 Öcalan and D’Souza, Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 2. page 265 
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indeed celebrate the institutional intricacies of modern liberal democracy as a tool for 
managing diverse populations. As described by both Ocalan and Asad, the state as a tool 
of mediation is an inevitable threat to individual autonomy, as it requires what Asad calls 
the “mediation” between the self and the transcendent national “identity”.  
However this definition of state was insufficient for Ocalan because it merely 
answers the how, and not the why, of state power. Öcalan aims for a more expansive 
definition of state that identifies the historical links between capitalism and the state as 
posited by Braudel, in order to give meaning to the motivation behind organizing society 
in such an exploitative and hierarchical manner. According to Öcalan : the fundamental 
failing and shortcoming of the anarchist contribution to socialism was defining capitalism 
as a purely economic system and not fully understanding its civilizational and power 
roots, as well as their inability to break the molds of modernity.105 
This newly adapted notion of political emancipation is a critical departure from 
the Marxist tradition in which Öcalan originates. This is because the Industrial 
Revolution created a set of circumstances in which the notion of class struggle was no 
longer relevant. “Energy for the first time was not dependent on manual labor. Machines 
possessed an engine design that removed most of the need for manual labor…. The 
consequences for both nature and society of these new forms of energy and machinery, 
with millions of different varieties, are not yet fully known, but are mostly negative. 
                                                 
105 Öcalan and D’Souza, Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 2.page 314 
 
 
 69 
Therefore the defense of society and nature was no longer a class or even a social 
struggle” it became an ontological question.106 Öcalan synthesizes Bookchin’s major 
contribution of recognizing the transformation of the social question from a question of 
opposing a particular social arrangement because of hierarchic dimensions and 
recognizing the ontological significance of a capitalistic society whose extractive 
dimensions threaten the ecological stability upon which continuing human existence 
rests. 107 
What Braudel meant by the anti-market as explained by Wallerstein, is that 
through his inverted analysis of material culture, Braudel revealed that what is referred to 
as capitalism is in fact the anti-market- a continuing chain of monopolists and speculators 
whose activities and networks constituted what Braudel referred to as true capitalism, 
which he distinguished from economy, which constituted the vast array of daily material 
culture practiced by society’s substratum. As Wallerstein remarks in an essay “Braudel 
on Capitalism,” this view radically changes the historiographical agenda, as it interrupts 
the traditional periodization held by both traditional Marxists and liberal economists, who 
view the development of capitalism as related to the emergence of the bourgeoisie, i.e. a 
city dwelling middle class operating in a free market. If, as in Braudel’s configuration, 
the capitalist is the monopolist, acting to ensure the highest level of profit and thereby 
opposing the free market forces, this presents an opportunity for a redefinition of the 
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relationship between state power and capitalism as functioning against “democratic 
civilization.108 Drawing from Braudel Öcalan suggests “That is state and power view 
economy as an area where the produced surplus product and values can be squeezed out, 
and where they establish their monopoly”109 
Following this logic, in order for statist civilizational structures to be undermined 
and replaced with democratic civilization, a major revolution in thought on par with the 
European Enlightenment is required in Middle Eastern countries. However, this will 
neither be the same European Enlightenment but one located within Islamic and Middle 
Eastern intellectual traditions and hermeneutics.  “If the Middle East is not able to realize 
its own enlightenment, then it cannot develop its own thought revolution. An analysis of 
the Prophet Muhammad could be the first step in this thought revolution.”110 Without 
undoing the epistemic Gordian Knot of the modern state, without challenging the 
instrumentalization of scientism as an epistemic tool of modern statecraft, without 
unravelling the subject-object orientation of modern philosophic systems, such a 
revolution is deemed by Ocalan as impossible. 
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DEFINING DEMOCRATIC CIVILIZATION 
To suggest that societies without states lack states is to suggest that the development of 
states is an inevitable occurrence in human cultures. The reverse view, that the 
development of state civilization to use Öcalan’s term, is a particular historical and 
civilizational development linked to a “civilizational daisy chain” which transferred these 
structures from Middle Eastern cultures into European capitalist modernity opens new 
vistas for understanding political transformation.  
If state civilization is a marriage of the monopoly power of capital to the 
hierarchical structures inherited in Öcalan’s civilizational daisy chain, how then do we 
arrive at a definition of democracy based on Öcalan’s critique? “Whilst the state excludes 
society by putting these affairs under its own jurisdiction and , therefore, they become the 
justification for state’s legitimacy, democratic society on the other hand proposes or 
ensures that these common affairs are taken care of by society as a whole.”111 Rather than 
liberal democratic legitimacy, which in Ocalan’s configuration is closer to Asad’s 
definition of liberal statecraft, a combination of coercive and non-coercive tactics to 
manufacture the “citizen” as a subject self-identifying with state power, true democratic 
governance requires as a matter of definition the active and non-hierarchically based 
participation of society, and the elimination of coercive means of liberal statecraft, among 
which is nationalism. This contrasts starkly with liberal democratic or social contract 
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theory, which sees democratic society as established on the exchange of individual rights 
for state legitimacy, in order to contravene bellum omnium contra omnes.  
“Whoever undertakes to institute a people must feel himself to be in a 
position to change, so to speak, human nature; to transform each individual, who 
by himself is perfect and solitary, in part of a larger whole of which this 
individual receives in some manner his life and his being; to alter the constitution 
of man in order to reinforce it, to substitute a partial, moral existence for an 
physical and independent existence which we have received from nature”112 
Rousseau himself admits of what Ocalan suggests is the fundamental injustice of 
liberal governance, its need to “change human nature” and “transform each individual.” 
Rousseau’s contract theory suggests that “society” only arises from political 
arrangements, rather than preceding it - moreover political society arises from agreements 
between individuals- whereas Öcalan’s formulation suggests that the state as an 
institution must be dialectically contrasted with society, which is itself collectively rather 
than individually conceived. This contrast is further sharpened by Ocalan’s insistence that 
the state as such ought not to have power to “transform the individual” in order to 
construct the body politic. 
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 Rousseau’s formulation additionally relies on a somewhat arbitrary separation 
between moral existence which can occur only within political institutions (echoing 
Hegel’s Philosophy of State) and physical existence, which is presumed to be anarchic, 
primitive and backwards. In Öcalan’s conception, society, which precedes the state, has 
constitutive democratic elements whose presence can be historically demonstrated 
through correctly practiced anthropology and historiography. Governance ought to be 
instituted in such a way as to preserve and elevate democratic civilization. The praxis of 
democratic civilization is then the defense of society against the state and other 
hierarchical structures.113 Revolutionary praxis additionally relies on discursive resistance 
to history which is written to marginalized democratic elements.  
“Just as the state represents the nucleus of the state civilization, the 
primitive communal order is the nucleus of the democratic civilization. This alone 
shows us how strong the democratic roots are. The subject of written history is 
state civilizations. The fact that societies have lived in communal orders for 
millions of years, taking care of their own affairs, does not fall within the scope of 
this history. 114 
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Chapter 3: History of Democratic Confederalism in Syria 
“ To emphasize the preeminence of contemporary society in history is, 
subtly, to elevate a deadening, homogenizing mass media over the spiritual 
yearning elicited by religious ceremonies, a mechanistic scientism over a colorful 
mythopoeic sensibility, and an icy indifference to the fate of one's immediate 
neighbors over a richly inter- twined system of mutual aid. Now that torture has 
returned to the modern world as a rationalized technique for interrogation and 
punishment, the medieval rack has become picayune by comparison. And while 
modern society no longer drags its heretics to the stake, it incinerates millions of 
utterly innocent people in gas chambers and nuclear infernos.” 
 -Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom 
 
My goal in this chapter is to demonstrate the relationship between the epistemic 
break that occurred in Öcalan’s theory of revolutionary change and the rise of democratic 
confederalist institutional structures in Rojava during the Rojavan revolution. In fact, 
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democratic confederalism as a transformational element predates the 2011 Rojavan 
Revolution, particularly within Turkey. The transformation of the PKK’s revolutionary 
practice inside Turkey, which following the capture of Öcalan intensified, has had a 
reverberating effect within Turkish activism - for example the establishment of anarchist 
collectives in eastern Turkey and the establishment of new anarchist periodicals such as 
Black Crow, the first volume of which emerged in 2011. 115 The popularization of both 
anarchist and democratic confederalist attitudes in eastern Turkey is closely linked to the 
gradual establishment of institutions, publications and networks facilitate the spread of 
political discourse. The historical genesis of these movements is an outgrowth of the 
failure of modern statecraft in the Middle East to succeed in its goal of “mediating” the 
individual, in the words of Asad. The ethno-nationalist movements which emerged from 
the oppression of the nationalistic attitude of Middle Eastern statecraft and there 
subsequent failure lead to the articulation of a new Turkish Left, which rather than 
advocating for state capture sought to dissolve elements of state power as such.116 
However, it remains an important question whether there is any way to institutionalize a 
mode of governance that does not require the kinds of statecraft that Ocalan so detests. 
One particular critique posed by opponents of communalism is that without the 
ability to “mediate” the individual or to construct a “national identity” which eases the 
process of governance in large democracies, it would be difficult to convince a diverse 
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population to not set their interests against one another. The origins of the idea of 
democratic confederalism as an alternative governing structure meant to solve this 
problem can be traced to a 1990 article by Murray Bookchin, published in volume 20 of 
Green Perspectives, in which he articulated the theoretical problem of decentralization, 
which lead to accusations of parochialization leveled against early anarchist thinkers like 
Proudhon, i.e that decentralization leads to formation of mutually antagonistic local 
interests.117 Confederalism proposes a solution by creating “a network of administrative 
councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-face democratic 
assemblies, whose function is purely administrative118 and practical, not a policy making 
one.” Policy making by contrast “is exclusively the right of popular community 
assemblies based on the practices of participatory democracy.” By this Öcalan sought to 
design a system which “democratizing interdependence without surrendering the 
principle of local control.”119 
 The first two chapters of this thesis help elucidate some of the theoretical issues 
regarding the commune system of Rojava. For example, Jongerden and Knapp (2016) use 
social contract theory to analyze the new political structure - despite the radical 
differences between traditional social contract theory and the commune structure in 
Rojava, as discussed in the conclusion of the last chapter.120 Rather than the individual, or 
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the family, the basic element of political organization in Rojava is the commune. 
Although the residual practices of the bureaucratic state have reportedly dogged attempts 
t completely democratize the decision making process, the commune provides an 
alternative, non-hierarchical  space for the discussion of community issues.121 The 
absence of the punitive state has benefited peacebuilding efforts through the 
implementation of peace and reconciliation councils (PRCS) in the Cezire canton.122 
Moreover, historical ties to earlier activist and ecological organizations were found to be 
instrumental in developing awareness of the importance of social ecology as a synthetic 
practice of confederalism through the Mesopotamian Ecology Movement.123 
 In 2007 the PKK incorporated Öcalan’s ideas into the KCK (Association of 
Communities in Kurdistan -Koma Civakên Kurdistan),  established in the “Declaration of 
Democratic Confederalism” written by Öcalan for the 5th Congress of the Kongra-Gel 
(Kongra Gelê Kurdistan – Kurdistan People's Congress) which was held in May of 2007 
in Qandil. This new umbrella organization, ideologically replaced the KKK, which had 
been in existence since 2005.124 Following the reorganization, the KCK initiated a 
marked shift in Turkish politics, including the establishment of the pro-Kurdish party, 
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Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Party for a Democratic Society). In Turkish local elections 
of March 2009, the party captured 100 Kurdish cities and towns, mainstreaming Kurdish 
politics in the Turkish political system.125 
 
 The development of confederalist institutions in Northern Syria however, 
followed a different route. The PYD was established by Salih Muslim, having formerly 
been a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria, a Barzani aligned political 
party that had been violently repressed by the Syrian state since the 60’s.126 In March of 
2004, large riots broke out in Qamishli between supporters of rival Arab and Kurdish 
football teams, allegedly after Kurdish fans were seen holding aloft signs praising Bush 
for his invasion of Iraq, which was seen by Kurds as a major factor in increased Kurdish 
independence in Iraq. 127 This lead to a major crackdown on the PYD, due to the Syrian 
government’s belief that they were behind the Qamishli riots as well as other incidents of 
public unrest that had occurred.128 Moreover, in contrast with other Syrian Kurdish 
parties, that had operated at times with the tacit consent of security forces, the Bashar al- 
Assad government viewed the PYD as a particular threat due to its association with 
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Abdullah Öcalan, and the strategic importance of the 1999 Adana agreement which 
provided for security cooperation between Turkey and Syria with the caveat that Syria 
cease allowing Öcalan and his political constituents to operate within the borders of 
Syria.129 
 
 Even prior to the revolution and the establishment of the Democratic 
Confederation of Northern Syria, the PYD was well understood to have significant 
support among the local Kurdish population because of the popularity of Öcalan’s ideas. 
Because of the history of repression of Kurdish political activities in Syria, details on the 
founding of the PYD remain somewhat shrouded. However, Abdullah Öcalan’s brother 
Osman Öcalan, has previously claimed that he was responsible for the founding of the 
party, on the instructions of Abdullah Öcalan. The task was initially assigned to Murat 
Karayilan, the current leader of the PKK, before Osman was selected for the task130. 
From 2006 to 2011, dozens of PYD activists were arrested and imprisoned by the Syrian 
government as part of its cooperation with Turkey under the Adana Agreement.  
As part of its Program of Self-Administration, the PYD declares that the current 
crisis occurring in Syria is not merely one brought about by an excess of corruption or 
other such factors, it is rather constitutive of the nation state itself as a form of 
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governance, as well as the underlying ideology of the state. It states that the current 
“explosion of popular movements” is due to the “bankruptcy of the project of the state, 
and the ideology of nationalism. By recognizing that the failure of the nation state 
ideology in providing a truly democratic society to Syrians, it further connects the 
Kurdish issue to problems which underlie the nation state, in an attempt to counterpoise 
the thesis-antithesis that nationalist ideology plays against minority communities.  
As I have suggested earlier, the epistemological break in Ocalan’s ideology from 
the separatist-nationalism that the PKK and other earlier Kurdish political parties 
advocated for, to democratic confederalism, is based on a new recognition that that 
earlier debates and conflicts regarding the status of ethnic minorities had in fact been 
limited and mediated by the larger discourse of nationalism, and what Ocalan calls “state 
civilization.” As I have revealed in my analysis, the function of what Talal Asad calls 
“liberal statecraft” is to to manufacture a transcendent conception of the self, which 
shapes practices of political citizenship in order to create what is called in the modern 
state system “democratic legitimacy.” As Ocalan describes and as is admitted by the 
major liberal thinkers, the state is not democratic in the sense that authority flows directly 
from the people, but rather the state must, as Rousseau says “recreate human nature” in 
order to manufacture a citizen that will “consent” to rule, whether in strictly authoritarian 
or democratic political modes. Detractors from this view will claim that there is a major 
difference between liberal democracies and the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, 
but here I concur with the views of Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood, who argue that the 
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similarities in the use of various coercive or non coercive techniques, suggest that these 
differences are to some degree exaggerated, since even liberal democracies rely on 
notions of “national identity”, to attempt to create legitimacy among a diverse body 
politic. It is worth remarking that the mostly highly surveilled societies are the US and 
Britain.131 
The goal than of dissolving the state is to attempt a major reformation in this 
conception of modern statecraft. Democracy is viewed by the PYD as autonomy from 
coercive or non coercive influence by state institutions. Given its history of oppression by 
the Syrian security apparatus,  and the influence of the work of Ocalan on the ideological 
contours of the movement, this break from nationalist-separatism to democratic 
confederalism is not surprising. In its charter the PYD states that rather than being based 
on ethnic nationalism, it proposes government based on “face to face” (to use Bookchin’s 
term) democratic volunteerism. 
The PYD faces a significant challenge in attempting to institutionalize a form of 
democracy that is fundamentally suspicions of the kinds of democratic institutionalism 
championed by the traditional liberal vanguard represented in the likes of Schumpeter 
and Huntington. The PYD names as “The Democratic Solution” the writing of a 
constitution which does not seek merely to balance power among branches of 
government, as the very notion of hierarchical power must be viewed as anti-democratic 
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within itself. Thus, the purpose of a truly democratic constitution is “to create the 
possibility of peaceful coexistence between the institutions of the state and the 
institutions of democracy without prejudice to either.” 
They go on to state that they democratic society will not be able to develop 
without “getting rid of the ideological hegemony which is defined by pure and dogmatic 
mechanical materialism which is imposed by the system of capitalist modernity on the 
world.”  Moreover, they identify as the new source of hegemony “cooperation with the 
regions dictators”. Key Enlightenment concepts which undergird theory of democratic 
government, derided by Ocalan, are identified by the PYD as a “societal disease.” They 
suggest for example that liberal individualism, which Ocalan views as a manufacture 
element of state society, is “a denial of historical society, and thus the source of the 
collapse and disintegration of society.” The democratic civilization proposed by the PYD 
is thus distinguished ideologically from democratic capitalist modernity in that it regards 
as essential the role of conscience and ethics, which originate in religion, and without 
which “society transforms into a bestial and dangerous tool.” In this sense the PYD’s 
political ideology closely reflects the distillation of Öcalan’s political writings.132  
 In May of 2011, the PYD joined the Kurdish Patriotic Movement, and in 
July it the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change, as well as the People 
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Council of Western Kurdistan, which was aligned with the Kurdistan Communities 
Union (KCK), and umbrella organization whose goal is to implement democratic 
confederalism.133 In 2011, the PYD joined the KNC, a Barzani aligned umbrella 
organization designed to coordinate activities between various Kurdish parties in Syria. 
134 On June 20th, of 2012, Syrian forces began to withdraw from Kurdish majority towns 
including Girke Lege in the Hasakah province, turning over control to the native Kurdish 
majority.135 On July 22, the fourth city of Derik in northeast Syria fell into the hands of 
the PYD. Although most cities were liberated peacefully when government forces 
withdrew to engage in intense fighting around Damascus, YPG units launched assaults on 
government agencies in Afrin and Cideris, near Aleppo to gain control.136 Qamishli, the 
largest Kurdish city in Syria, was liberated following negotiations with the central 
government.137 In accordance with the Erbil agreement, signed by major Kurdish parties 
including the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdish National Council (KNC) then 
began to negotiate the organization of local government, allowing for joint control over 
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liberated Kurdish towns under a governing coalition known as the Kurdish Supreme 
Committee.138 
However, despite the Erbil agreement which provided for joint government of 
Kurdish regions liberated from the central Syrian government, the PYD acquired a larger 
amount of leverage due to its popularity and the strength of its armed wing, the YPG, 
which gained control over checkpoints in and out of Kurdish cities in Syria.139 The PYD 
prevented Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces from entering Kurdish areas, insisting on 
autonomy rather than joining the fight against Assad.140 This was largely a response to 
the refusal of the Syrian National Council to accede to the principal of self-determination 
for Kurdish areas.141 Mounting tension between the Syrian government and local 
authorities lead to clashes between protesters and government forces in the city of 
Qamishli.142 By 2013, the greater popularity of the PYD, which advanced a message of 
building a multi-ethnic governing coalition in opposition to ceding control to Kurdish 
nationalists, established political dominance over Rojavan towns in the form of its control 
over popular assemblies,143 leading to the obsolescence of the Kurdish Supreme 
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Committee as a governing force in Rojava.144 Government of the newly autonomous 
regions split into a Barzani aligned movement, the KNC, and a PYD aligned movement, - 
the Movement for a Democratic Society -TEV-DEM. The Syrian government released 
over 600 prisoners who had been arrested in relation to organizing activities with the 
PYD.145 
In January of 2014, the Afrin, Jazeera and Kobani cantons of Rojava declared 
their independence, following the approval of the Rojavan Constitution.146 Rojava gained 
international fame during the period from 2014-2016 following the Siege of Kobane,147 
in which a coalition of PYG, PKK and leftist elements of the Syrian opposition captured 
the besieged city from ISIS control. The ability of YPG forces to capture and hold 
territory lead to the declaration of the de facto independent Democratic Federation of 
Rojava, uniting the individual cantons in northern Syria under the control of the PYD.148 
Despite Rojava’s control over 25% of Syrian territory, negotiating parties at the Geneva 
talks refused to allow for PYD participation.149 The announcement met round 
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condemnation from the Syrian government, opposition forces and alienated Kurdish 
nationals.150 In 2016, following the expansion of the Rojavan territory TEV-DEM  
declared the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria encompassing and uniting newly 
annexed regions and dropping the term Rojava.151 
The Syrian government called the Democratic Union Party’s recent sweep of 
local council elections152 “illegal unilateral action,”153 while Iraq, Iran and Turkey 
expressed concern of regional Kurdish uprisings.154 In 2016 Rojava abandoned its 
separatist aspirations in its new constitution155 and currently advocates for a federalist 
system in Syria that grants local autonomy while maintaining the territorial integrity of 
Syria,156 though the central government continues to lambast its elections.157 
 
In order to ensure the emergence of a democratic confederalist system of 
government in Northern Syria, PYD activists had to contend with a powerful branch of 
Kurdish political parties that is both embedded in traditional nationalist ideological 
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discourse and supported by the formidable political and military infrastructure of the 
KRG. The KNC, which until its dissolution was the administrative coalition governing 
the autonomous region, was formed under the auspices of Masud Barzani in 2012 in 
Erbil, the intent of which was to unify the Kurdish parties in opposition to the Assad 
government and advocate for a federal arrangement similar to that which the KRG enjoys 
with Baghdad, based on the Kurdish majority population of Northern Syria. The PYD 
and other aligned parties in the KNC however rejected the creation of a government 
based on ethnicity, due to their opposition to the ideology of nationalism. At a conference 
held in Cairo in July of 2012, as Kurdish areas were being liberated from Syrian 
government control, fighting broke out over the issue of granting authority powers to a 
coordinating committee that was proposed to organize the various factions in a united 
front against Assad.158 The move would have represented a significant blow to attempts 
by the PYD to both exercise control over the autonomous regions as well as potentially 
halt progress on the implementation of democratic confederalism. However, talks 
between the Syrian opposition and the KNC stalled over the issue of identifying Syria as 
an “Arab Nation.”159 The main divide between the PYD and the KNC was the PYD’s 
refusal to ally itself with the Syrian opposition, and its focus on “self-defense” rather than 
overthrowing the regime.160 
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The ideological connection between the PYD and the PKK later lead to a Turkish 
effort to support Masoud Barzani’s attempts to gain more control over northern Syria.161 
The Turkish government, beginning in 2013, supported the KNC as a rival to PYD’s 
supremacy in Syria, which lead to an escalation of tensions. By late 2013, one of the most 
prominent and influential Kurdish leaders, openly rejected the prospect of autonomy for 
northern Syria, after the PYD declared an autonomous government in Syria.162 In the 
decision, the PYD isolated other elements of the KNC which sympathized with 
Barzani163 
The PYD specifically rejected various elements of traditional nationalist Kurdish 
politics in a bid to support a multi-ethnic governing coalition including the regions Arab, 
Turkmen, Yazidi and Assyrian minorities.164 By 2014, the KRG had declared that it 
would not deal diplomatically with the autonomous cantons of Cizire, Afrn and 
Kobani.165The decision by the PYD to declare an autonomous region was viewed as a 
threat to traditional Kurdish nationalist politics, the ultimate goal of which was to create 
an independent Kurdish state, or barring that, a network of federalized regions similar to 
the KRG in Iraq.166 By pursuing a governing policy based on democratic confederalism, 
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which specifically rejects that construct of the nation state, the PYD upended the 
anticipated trajectory of Kurdish independence.  
 In response to the intransigence of the KRG on the issue of recognizing the 
independent Cantons, the Rojava Coordination, a civil society organization based in 
Syria, called upon the KDP, the leading Kurdish party in Iraqi Kurdistan, to recognize the 
autonomous administration.167 Despite accusations of only representing a factional 
government in the region, the Rojava Coordination garnered the support of 91 
independent political parties and societal organizations, emphasizing in its appeal that 
traditional geopolitics were impeding the opportunity to implement a democratic society 
in the region.168 Barzani’s stance towards the PYD proved unpopular even among 
traditional Kurdish parties, as demonstrated when the largest opposition parties in the 
KRG denounced the KDP’s policies towards Rojava while demanding the recognition of 
the Rojava cantons.169 
 Conflict over the radical democratic project undertaken in Rojava reached a peak 
when the Barzani controlled KDP administration of the KRG began to fortify borders 
between Syria and Iraq Kurdistan, despite a long tradition of along relatively unmolested 
transit across those borders.170 Meanwhile, Barzani continued to accuse the PYD of 
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collaborating with the Assad government, despite the fact that by 2014 many elements of 
the FSA had splintered of into right-wing Islamist movements that the PYD actively 
fought in Kobane.171 The PYD’s decision to resist aligning with international actors in 
Syria was justified in the wake of revelations that elements of the FSA and US backed 
opposition forces had splintered into to right-wing terror groups like Al-Nusra Front.172 
 IMPLEMENTING DEMOCRATIC CHANGE 
 Following the emergence of the PYD as the preeminent political force in Northern 
Syria, their task became to implement confederalist structures. Democratic 
confederalism, as described in Chapter 2, relies on a strict separation between policy 
making, which is controlled at the local level, and coordination in a confederalist 
structure. The lower level is composed of neighborhood assemblies, which appoint 
delegates to send to the city assembly. Legislative power is vested in the city assembly, 
which determines policy and passes laws. Village assemblies within a given province 
function autonomously, except in cases where major decisions concerning an entire 
province need to be made, in which case village assemblies send delegates to the city 
assembly.  
 This structure emerges and functions autonomously of state institutions, and 
thereby constitutes a manner of mollification of state authority, both by relocating 
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legislative authority away from state bureaucracy and delegitimizing the roots of state 
power by promoting a message of autonomy. This is described by the PYD as a system of 
“parallel authority”, whose ultimate goal is to eliminate the state not through violent 
overthrow but gradual, institutional erosion of state legitimacy.173 In Turkey, the above 
described structure is coordinated by the Democratic Society Congress, which 
coordinates between various Kurdish organizations in Turkey, including hundreds of civil 
society organizations, political parties and syndicates. The remaining members are 
composed of delegates from village assemblies. In Turkey, the provincial assemblies 
organized under the DTK played an important role in mainstreaming Kurdish candidates 
for Turkish parliament.  
 Another critical aspect brought of democratic confederalism involves the 
foundation of new villages or the transformation of existing villages based on 
communitarian ideals stressed by Öcalan. However, despite the ideological and tactical 
transformation of Kurdish politics since the capture of Öcalan, the Turkish state has not 
relented in its policy of suppressing Kurdish political activities and attacking the 
democratic confederalist project in Turkey as well as in northern Syria. Kurdish activists 
and politicians are routinely targeted with politically motivated arrest and accusations of 
terrorism.174 The pretext used is that because the KCK is the umbrella organization under 
which confederalist structures are organized, and because the PKK is an affiliate of the 
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KCK, anyone associated with the KCK (meaning nearly any politically active Kurd in 
Turkey) can be linked to the PKK and thus accused of terrorism. Inside Turkey, 
confederalism proposes regional forms of autonomous and local government in which 
cultural and ethnic differences expresses themselves openly without state interference or 
the threat of nationalism. This reflects a philosophical transformation proposed by 
Öcalan, who adopted it from Murray Bookchin’s interpretation of the phrase “unity of 
differences.” 
“In organic societies the differences between individuals, age groups, 
sexes-and between humanity and the natural manifold of living and nonliving 
phenomena-were seen (to use Hegel's superb phrase) as a "unity of differences" 
or "unity of diversity," not as hierarchies. Their outlook was distinctly ecological, 
and from this outlook they almost un-consciously derived a body of values that 
influenced their behavior toward individuals in their own communities and the 
world of life.” 
Confederalist structures thus seek to promote this philosophical outlook within a 
governing framework emphasizing the right of communities to defend themselves, as 
well as the right of multi-ethnic societies to associate based on the principle of  “unity-in-
difference” in which individual culture is expressed rather than suppressed. As 
demonstrated by the conflict between the PYD and Barzani-aligned Kurdish groups, the 
advent of democratic confederalism as an organizing principle of Kurdish politics 
necessarily deemphasizes nationalism as an organizing concept, and threatens the 
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political projects associated with nationalist movements in the Middle East. At the same 
time, it has created a significant opportunity for a radically different approach to 
organizing democratic governance among a diverse population, one that emphasizes the 
ills that statism and nationalism have engendered in the region, not the least of which is 
the oppression of Yazidis, Assyrians, Turkmen, and the Arab left at the hands of 
oppressive nationalist governments. As has been suggested by Öcalan, the semi-feudal 
nature of Kurdish politics in Iraq Kurdistan, continued military attacks on villages in 
Northern Syria by Turkey, which considered the threat of democratic confederalism as a 
structure challenging and undermining state sovereignty within its own borders as a 
major regional threat, all pose significant challenges to the prospect of a continuing 
emancipatory project. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 As I argue in the introduction, the Rojava Revolution is the result of a new 
articulation of democratic change emerging both from an epistemic break in the political 
and ideological thought of influential figures like Abdullah Ocalan, as well as the failure 
of modern statecraft to address the demands of ethnic and religious minorities. The 
transformation in political ideology which occurred as the result of the influence of post 
modern and anarchist intellectual traditions on the Turkish left has significantly altered 
the contours of Kurdish politics with major consequences for regional politics. However, 
due to the fact that the democratic ideology advocated by confederalist political parties is 
based on a critique rather than an acceptance of modern theories of liberal governance, its 
philosophical elements remain poorly understood.  
 Öcalan’s arrest and imprisonment, rather the marking the end of the political 
movement he began in 1984, appeared to have triggered a shift in both the practice and 
ideology of Kurdish politics across the region, in Turkey and in Syria. This 
transformation has roots in similar emancipatory projects in European history, such as the 
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Levellers during the English Civil War, the 1871 Paris Commune, and Revolutionary 
Catalonia.  Öcalan’s political writings, however, prolonged his de facto leadership and 
influence in the democratic confederalist movement established a new philosophical basis 
based on a critique of capitalism and modernity emerging from Bookchin’s theory of 
social ecology and a synthesis of various post-modern authors whose work was 
popularized by the Turkish left during the post 1980 coup period. These developments 
have resulted in a major epistemic break between traditional ethno-politics and a new 
emancipatory framework that cuts across various ethnic, social and religious groups.  
 Moreover, Öcalan’s work reflects a unique synthesis of major works of 
postmodern thought into a sustained and comprehensive critique. This synthesis was then 
distilled into a sustained political project which emerges from outside of the central 
domain of liberalism. Rather than producing an immanent critique of the modern 
condition by suggesting that the solution to the woes caused by the institution of the 
nation state and the advent of capitalism to the region might be solved by “completing” 
the project of modernity, as is suggested by the likes of Jürgen Habermas, Öcalan 
proposed a new political project which, while not relying on anachronistic notions of 
traditionalism or fundamental religiosity, proposed a means of political emancipation that 
rescues the notion of the “democratic civilization” from the jaws of hierarchical structure 
built around it. In this sense Öcalan managed to create a realm of political thought which 
is at once democratic and decidedly non-Western in spite of his interest in and use of 
Western philosophy. Öcalan’s concept of the democratic civilization is one which 
redeems the autonomy of the individual and the community and sanctifies them in a 
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decentralized political structure. It rejects the instrumentalist attitudes of capital 
accumulation, promoting instead sustainable ecology.  
 Such a reformation, as Bookchin and Öcalan emphasize, an attempt to recapture 
an earlier animistic attitude towards nature thereby abandoning all principles of analytical 
reasoning or science that modernity has undoubtedly ushered in. As Bookchin remarks 
“ perhaps we can achieve a way of thinking and experiencing that involves a quasi-
animistic respiritization of phenomena-inanimate as well as animate-without abandoning 
the insights provided by science and analytical reasoning.” As Adorno and Horkheimer 
revealed, Enlightenment philosophy involved a transformation of the concept of logos as 
an immanent, discoverable reason embedded in the natural functioning of ecological and 
natural systems, to “rationalization” a form of analytic logic that treats all objects of its 
analysis as means to narrowly defined goals. When speaking of the premodern subject’s 
attachment to conceptions of humility, brotherly love, or justice, Horkheimer writes 
“They held to such ideas because they saw in them elements of truth, because they 
connected them with the idea of logos, whether in the form of God or of a transcendental 
mind, or even of nature as an eternal principle”175 
 Öcalan is able to craft a political project centered around a reform of modernity 
that neither, as many Islamic traditionalist movements have aimed, attempts to impose a 
reactionary and deeply authoritarian vision onto modern society, nor one which, as the 
liberal critics of modernity have suggested, seeks to “complete a project of modernity” 
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that seems to inevitably lead to an enshrinement of “statecraft” as the means of 
constructing the body politic and mediating articulations of the individual. This approach 
brings with it necessarily new problems with comprehending seemingly well understood 
liberal concepts of international relations and political theory, such as the social contract, 
the role of institutions in maintaining democratic order, the correct formation of 
constitutional governments, the meaning of justice. Much of the intellectual traditions 
devoted to analyzing and exploring these concepts have fallen into conceptual disarray 
precisely because they suffer from a “silent statism”, a willingness to unquestionably 
abide by, and failure to question the way in which traditional formulations of liberal 
political theory may undermine rather than advance the democratic aspirations of non-
Western societies. Ocalan’s articulation of an indigenous concept of democracy then 
stands in stark contrast to, for example, Rawls’s resigned theory  of the “overlapping 
consensus”, which condemns diverse societies to live in a forever unresolvable state of 
tension. Ocalan chose rather to adopt Bookchin’s notion of “unity in diversity”, which 
provides a way to structure institutions that frees communities from the need to control or 
beseech state power to preserve their cultural or religious heritage, or protect their 
democratic autonomy.  Lesli Lipson whose book Democratic Civilization initially, if 
conservatively, proposed an analytical approach which separates democratic institutions 
from the concept of democratic civilization, lent an important conceptual distinction to 
Öcalan’s work.   
 If the events of the Syrian Civil war demonstrate anything, it is that nationalism 
and statism constitute discursive structures which shape and often limit the potential for 
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new and more creative forms of political resistance that are not confined to struggle over 
the institutions of state power. Contemporary authors have noted that a historiographical 
approach to the post-WWI construction of Arab national identity was rooted in 
constructing event-driven epistemic break in which the Arabs experienced a “national 
awakening”, which subsequently drove their demands for independence. This 
historiography clearly ignores vast social and political complexities, not the least the role 
of class, ideology, education and other factors in developing competing networks of 
political actors who advocated for various approaches to resolving the post-Ottoman 
crisis, and whose ideas contain both continuity and dissidence with past political practice 
and habitus. In his work Being Modern in the Middle East, David Watenpauh writes that 
as a result of this historiography, “Nationalism and/or national consciousness becomes an 
essence rather than an ideology with clear historical roots in nineteenth century Western 
Europe and the Americas. Conceived in such a vein, rebellions against state and imperial 
authorities and other similar movements in the Ottoman Empire, can be construed as 
evidence of national consciousness, give an authentic, real and subaltern genealogy to 
contemporary nationalist movements, rather than one that is “derived,” “imagined,” and 
elite in the ways described by a diverse cadre of theoreticians of nationalism from Partha 
Chatterjee to Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson.”176 
The consequence of the inability to question the nationalist framework explain to 
a certain extent the failure of the larger project to transform Syria though civil war. The 
                                                 
176 Keith David Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, 
and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton University Press, 2014). page 183 
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disintegration of the FSA into radical factions responsible for horrific acts of violence, 
the role of the US and CIA in arming radicals, in supporting Turkish aggression against 
the Democratic Confederation of Northern Syria, all point to theoretical and structural 
limitations which political actors either work within or work to overcome. The durability 
of confederalist institutions in Syria remains unclear, but the widespread popularity and 
the speed of institution building may have major consequences for how the process of 
“democratization” in the Middle East will play out of the coming decades.  
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